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Abstract
It is generally agreed that one origin of machine bias is resulting from characteristics within the dataset on which
the algorithms are trained, i.e., the data does not warrant a generalized inference. We, however, hypothesize that a
different ‘mechanism’, hitherto not articulated in the literature, may also be responsible for machine’s bias, namely
that biases may originate from (i) the programmers’ cultural background, such as education or line of work, or (ii) the
contextual programming environment, such as software requirements or developer tools. Combining an experimental
and comparative design, we studied the effects of cultural metaphors and contextual metaphors, and tested whether
each of these would ‘transfer’ from the programmer to program, thus constituting a machine bias. The results show
(i) that cultural metaphors influence the programmer’s choices and (ii) that ‘induced’ contextual metaphors can be
used to moderate or exacerbate the effects of the cultural metaphors. This supports our hypothesis that biases in
automated systems do not always originate from within the machine’s training data. Instead, machines may also
‘replicate’ and ‘reproduce’ biases from the programmers’ cultural background by the transfer of cultural metaphors into
the programming process. Implications for academia and professional practice range from the micro programming-level
to the macro national-regulations or educational level, and span across all societal domains where software-based systems
are operating such as the popular AI-based automated decision support systems.
Keywords: Biases, programmers, AI, cultural background, metaphors, priming, randomized controlled trial.
1. Introduction
Biases are manifestations of incorrect judgments result-
ing from cognitive tendencies that humans exhibit in sit-
uations of uncertainty or when there is insufficient infor-
mation but a judgment must be made nevertheless. Biases
are often difficult to study because of the complex thinking
‘machinery’ that makes up the human brain and because
of the human’s interaction with its complex social environ-
ment. Moreover, people are usually unaware of their own
biases and they may even be prone to rationalize their
own biased tendencies. Nevertheless, by employing care-
fully designed experiments, both the specific psychologi-
cal mechanisms that lead to biases and the occurrences
of specific human biases have successfully been identified
and well established (e.g. Gilovich et al. (2002); Tver-
sky & Kahneman (1974); Oliver (2014); Wilson & Gilbert
(2003)).
Due to the increase of power and societal penetration
of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, the occurrence of
artificial biases have been observed and described, some-
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thing which is rather counter to our intuition that ma-
chines are unbiased and objective. Biases in AI have a
strong negative impact in society, prompting organizations
like ACM and the European Parliament to issue strong
statements ACM Policy Council (2017); STOA (2019) and
prominent researchers to publish lengthy reports Brundage
et al. (2018) warning against biased AI.
The occurrence of biases in AI have been observed to
appear due to biased training data on which these algo-
rithms are built Feldman et al. (2015); Mittelstadt et al.
(2016); Caliskan et al. (2017); Silva & Kenney (2019). For
example, if the limited sample-data that the algorithms are
trained on are not sufficiently representative of the larger
population-data that the algorithms are subsequently un-
leashed upon, then the algorithmic judgments would not
be valid but instead biased. Or, for example, if the train-
ing data shows a strong relationship between two variables,
say, ethnicity and crime Zou & Schiebinger (2018); Dres-
sel & Farid (2018), a bias may occur because it is assumed
that the relationship is causal when the relationship be-
tween the two variables may in fact be non-causal and
instead be caused by a third variable, say, poverty.
However, we have reasons to believe that there is a sec-
ond source of biases in algorithms/programs, which has
been little investigated Kirkpatrick (2016). We believe
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(and argue in this paper) that biases may also be trans-
ferred from the human programmer into the final artifact,
i.e., the program. Transfer (or contagion) of biases be-
tween humans is well-known, such as, for example, the
conformity bias (e.g., Moscovici & Faucheux (1972)). Ad-
ditionally, a transfer of biases due to influence on humans
from social and cultural institutions like media or educa-
tion is equally known (e.g., Bourdieu & Passeron (1977);
Lakoff & Johnson (2008)). Given the human cognitive ten-
dencies (explained in Section 2) to employ inappropriate
mental judgment-modes in situations that are “uncertain”,
combined with influences from institutional agendas, hu-
man biases are ubiquitous. There is, however, yet no ev-
idence to support the related possibility of programmer
biases being encoded, in some way, in their programming
artefacts. In fact, some argue against this view by claim-
ing that programmers are “immune” to biases due to their
technical training and tools/methods used.
Target Audience. The work reported in this paper is rel-
evant for researchers from several fields. First of all, peo-
ple working in AI and machine learning can be interested
in our proposal that biases in machine learning can come
not only from the data but also from the people program-
ming the algorithms. We study this to some consider-
able detail, as we explain in the rest of this introduction.
Second, people working in psychology and cognitive sci-
ences can be interested in this new application that we
propose, where they can apply their skills and methods
to study this new form of human bias and its transfer to
machines. Third, practitioners working with software en-
gineering or managing software development teams can be
interested in studying more various programming environ-
ments and tools to see how much human bias is transferred
to the programs in each situation. Finally, at a macro
level, both governments, private business enterprises, and
NGOs would become aware of machine bias originating
from human programmers who unknowingly transfer the
influences from their own cultural backgrounds to the ma-
chine programs. Thus, the target audiences are diverse and
would benefit both on a micro level, e.g., in research and
development, and in (computer science) education, as well
as on a macro level, e.g., in issuing improved knowledge-
informed national regulations on the domains where auto-
mated decision-support systems operate.
1.1. Two Main Questions
The present study investigates methodically, experi-
mentally, and empirically the hypothesis of bias transfer
in programming, providing a first convincing argument
for inspiring more empirical studies to be taken in the
same direction. As such, in this study our main focus
is to find support for (or against) the hypothesis that peo-
ple may unknowingly and inadvertently transfer biases to
computer programs that they build. In particular, this
work supports the hypothesized existence of an alterna-
tive mechanism than the one that is already known, that
may render AI biased, i.e., in addition to the well-studied
cases of biases originating from data. However, we do not
study specific biases (s.a., gender or racial), nor do we test
or suggest specific programming methods and tools that
could counteract bias transfers, as this would be a task for
future research.
The two main hypotheses that we set to investigate
are:
I. Are biases being transferred from the human program-
mer to the program artefact?
This is studied in a basic form with a bias revealing
test that we detail in Section 3, which we impose on
the subjects of our study, as described in Section 5.
The biases that we study are of both cultural and
contextual nature.
II. Can programmers be manipulated, i.e., primed by in-
ducing a new bias, and is this new bias then trans-
ferred to the program?
In Section 4 we describe the method that we use to
prime our study subjects towards the same biases
studied for the first question. Subsequent sections
then describe how we used the priming in our studies
and their outcomes.
One can see several immediate benefits of the present
study alone. For example, in education one could mea-
sure how well programming courses train the students,
by measuring the bias transfer-rate at the start and end
of the courses. Another example is to measure how ef-
fective some technology quality assurance method is at
removing or identifying programmer’s biases, like testing
frameworks, peer programming, abstract/detailed speci-
fications, code generators, etc. Moreover, regarding the
growing population of ‘lay’ programmers in the smart-
living and IoT-ubiquitous programming environments of
today (i.e., almost everyone in technologically ‘modern’
societies) both business companies and consumers would
benefit from more insight into the non-conscious influence
of culture and context on the programming choices that
are made by the ‘novice’ programmer that has no formal
training. In terms of education and learning, we argue that
this insight could be used to help consumers become more
aware of the cultural and contextual influences that shape
their cognitive tendencies when they are programming.
1.2. Key Methodological Aspects
We employ several different methods to help us divide
and detail these two general hypotheses. In short, here are
the main aspects that are specific to our studies; details
about our methods can be found throughout the paper
and especially in Section 6.
A. We develop a cognitive task intended to reveal biases
originating from the cultural background of a program-
mer, such as education, line of work, and free-time ac-
tivities.
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B. We investigate users with different programming skill
levels, i.e., from professional to amateur.
C. We investigate a very general form of bias, but well
hidden inside a programming task. This is because
the programming task needs to be appropriate also for
people with little or no programming skills.
D. We investigate whether inducing a bias is effective.
E. We investigate whether people educated in program-
ming exhibit less biases and are less prone to manipu-
lation.
Aspect A. To reveal the existence or nonexistence of cul-
tural biases, we decided that the respondents in our studies
should have different educational/professional backgrounds,
i.e., from social and natural sciences, as well as from arts
and cultural studies; see Section 6.1.
Aspect B. is motivated by the observation that increas-
ingly more lay people (wrt. programming) are interacting
and designing rather complex systems. Nowadays it is
not only expert developers that program, but people with
all levels of expertise carry out various programming-like
tasks, from simple configurations of IoT systems in their
smart home, to more complex configurations of technology
systems in their work, to more unconventional forms of
programming using visual languages and/or domain spe-
cific languages, and even assembling ready-programmed
components into a final software system as done, e.g., in
the IBM’s IoT development environment1. This is hap-
pening mainly because of the proliferation of simple (ab-
stract, graphical, etc.) programming languages and inter-
faces aimed at non-programmers to design domain spe-
cific information systems, e.g.: a biologist programming
a DNA search or an oil-engineer programming a complex
database search. Therefore, in our study we use a simple
programming task presented as fictitious, i.e., imagining
to be programming. This allows us to perform our study
both on programmers and non-programmers.
Aspect C. is important in order to avoid any intrinsic de-
biasing, and thus we must “hide” from the subjects the
real goal of the study behind a seemingly unrelated goal,
i.e., the “study of natural language in programming”. We
must avoid giving any indications or hints to the study
subjects about our intention to study their cognitive ten-
dencies during the programming task.
Aspect D. is a standard study approach in research on
biases because many types of biases can also be experi-
mentally induced, sometimes termed priming Tulving &
Schacter (1990); Yonelinas (2002). We thus also study the
influence of contextual metaphors, in addition to the cul-
tural bias, from A. Once we have established in this paper
1IBM Watson IoT Platform https://www.ibm.
com/internet-of-things/solutions/iot-platform/
watson-iot-platform
whether or not priming also works in the setting of pro-
gramming biases, other works can carry out more detailed
studies about whether such priming already exists “out
there” (intentionally or not) and what types of priming
would work and to what degree.
Aspect E. is meant to investigate a considerable opposi-
tion that our idea has encountered, i.e., that programmers
cannot be biased when writing code. Moreover, we also
aim to study whether it is possible to experimentally in-
duce a bias on this category of users, or if this particular
category is more resistant to priming and bias-transfer to
programs than other user categories.
Our present work is motivated by the need to prove
or disprove the idea that human biases could be transfer-
able to the programming artifacts. However, which types
of biases and how dangerous these might be are not the
subject of this study. Other specific studies would have to
be devised, maybe similar to the research on human biases
developed in the psychology field.
1.3. Overview of the Paper
The contributions of this paper are presented schemat-
ically in the diagram from Figure 1. The vertical axis of
the diagram represents types of biases (or degrees of in-
fluence) with the arrow indicating a direction from more
general, long-term, and strong biases to more contextual,
short-lived, and weak forms of biases. In this paper we
study two extremes, namely biases coming from the back-
ground of a person (including socio-cultural, educational,
and professional influences), and biases coming from ma-
nipulations such as priming. However, in between these
two extremes one may study other forms of biases coming,
e.g., from working cultures (think of programmers work-
ing for Google compared to a startup), or from media or
propaganda. These biases form over a considerable pe-
riod, e.g., several years, which is shorter than a life-time
or childhood period, but longer than minutes as it is the
case with priming.
Our results will be presented in the end of the paper, in
Section 9, showing how these two types of biases are being
transferred from humans to programs, providing evidence
that transfer exists in both cases. In order to support
such a new claim, the rest of the paper is devoted to the
development of our studies and analysis of the data. Im-
portantly, Section 8 contains the analysis from our control
questions, which were meant to help us understand bet-
ter whether the main elements (and assumptions) of our
study were correct. The first important element of our
study is presented in Section 3 where we develop a bias
revealing test, which is used for both types of biases. This
cognitive task allows respondents to answer only with one
of the three rationales that are listed on the middle line
of the diagram. In Section 8.1 we analyse how well our
test worked, using one of our control questions. Section 4
details the manipulation method that we used, involving
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Figure 1: Overview of the contributions of the paper with references to relevant sections.
priming participants with metaphors hidden in a fictitious
‘Philosopher’ story. How well these manipulations worked
is studied again with a control question involving listing of
‘similar words’ in Section 8.2. We created three metaphors
to match the three rationales, which in turn match with
three kinds of educational lines (or views on life). This cor-
respondence is reflected in the vertical alignment of these
elements in the diagram. We have thus chosen our par-
ticipants to represent these three different backgrounds,
as detailed in Section 6. To test the assumptions about
our participants’ backgrounds we used one control ques-
tion (analysed in Section 8.3) asking them to rank the
three ‘life-aspects’ listed on the bottom line of the dia-
gram. The rest of the paper is devoted to presenting in
Section 5 the major phases of designing our surveys and
our studies using usability testing, and analysing the data
and demographics, in Section 7.
2. Cognitive Biases in Human Judgment
Numerous robust experiments in psychological science
studying human judgment and decision making over nearly
five decades have unanimously arrived at the now well-
established fact that humans have a tendency to exhibit
cognitive biases. Contrary to making an error, which rep-
resents a single incident in which one makes an incorrect
judgment, a bias arises from a systematic tendency to
commit the same type of error over time or in different
situations. Thus, a cognitive bias can be understood as a
sustained tendency to make an incorrect judgment. The
tendency to exhibit a cognitive bias is particularly promi-
nent in situations or contexts that are characterized by
uncertainty, e.g., when processing information that are ei-
ther too voluminous or too complex for the human brain
to handle, or when forced to make a rapid judgment in a
time-frame that is too short to review the information at
hand, or when there is insufficient information for making
the required decision, like in underspecified software re-
quirements in programming. This last aspect, i.e., under-
specification, is what we study empirically in this paper.
Uncertain situations have a tendency to prompt the
use of automatic and non-conscious cognitive processing.
Whereas controlled and conscious cognitive processing, of-
ten termed Analytic thinking, System 2-thinking, or “slow
thinking”, is the preferred cognitive mode for arriving at a
correct judgment when the situation is in fact uncertain,
this mode is not always easily attained. This is because
the brain’s preferred cognitive mode is the automatic and
non-conscious System 1, also termed Intuitive thinking or
“fast thinking”. In situations characterized by certainty,
“fast thinking” usually works well because we are on a “fa-
miliar terrain”. In uncertain situations, however, System
1 has a tendency to kick in and spark our automatic think-
ing mode even if it should not. But how does System 1
actually arrive at incorrect judgments? The reason is sim-
ply because our brains employ mental shortcuts, which are
very useful in situations characterized by certainty. The
problem is that our brain employs System 1 also in situa-
tions that are characterized by uncertainty, when it should
in fact consciously activate System 2 Kahneman (2011).
Two key concepts in mental shortcuts, also termed
heuristic processing, are mental accessibility (closely re-
lated to the availability heuristic) and mental represen-
tativeness Tversky & Kahneman (1974); Gilovich et al.
(2002); Thaler & Sunstein (2009). When something is eas-
ily retrievable from short-term or long-term memory, we
have a tendency to wrongfully regard it as something that
is also occurring frequently, although it may not be oc-
curring frequently at all. We may also make an incorrect
judgment about an unfamiliar phenomenon by identifying
superficial resemblances to a familiar phenomenon. Be-
cause it is cognitively effortful to identify substantial simi-
larities between two phenomena, particularly in situations
characterized by incomplete information and uncertainty,
superficial similarities are more easily identified. In many
instances this results in an incorrect judgment. To summa-
rize, situations or contexts characterized by uncertainty in
one way or another, prompts an inappropriate cognitive
processing in System 1-mode, where the employment of
mental shortcuts leads us to arrive at an incorrect judg-
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ment, thus exhibiting a cognitive bias.
2.1. Algorithmic Bias: the Data or the Programmer
Media and the general public seem to have the assump-
tion that machines and algorithms are in themselves neu-
tral and objective. However, it has been known for quite
some time (and recently also came to the attention of sev-
eral public actors) that complex algorithms, such as those
from artificial intelligence among others, may exhibit bi-
ases s.a.: racial bias Schlesinger et al. (2018), gender dis-
crimination Zou & Schiebinger (2018) and other socially
relevant types of biases Friedman & Nissenbaum (1996);
Boyd & Crawford (2012); Jobin et al. (2019), when pro-
cessing information in the support of human and institu-
tional decision making Corbett-Davies et al. (2017); Dres-
sel & Farid (2018). This phenomenon is commonly la-
beled as machine biases or algorithmic bias, and has been
confirmed in different areas (published in respective top
venues), e.g., in big data Hajian et al. (2016), web Baeza-
Yates (2016, 2018), autonomous systems Danks & Lon-
don (2017). Among institutions that have raised concerns
about the existence of “biased algorithms” are: the ACM
US Public Policy Council2; the EU Parliament3; the New
York City Council which passed a bill on “Accountabil-
ity and transparency in algorithms for public agency sup-
port”4; ERCIM Rauber et al. (2019); World Wide Web
Foundation5 and many more Cath et al. (2018). An in-
fluential research report Brundage et al. (2018) has raised
even more concerns about harmful algorithms, and has re-
cently been joined by articles in major publication venues
such as Science and Nature Obermeyer et al. (2019); Zou
& Schiebinger (2018); Gianfrancesco et al. (2018) and by
scholarly books Boden (2008); O’Neil (2016).
All the works above focus on the data that AI algo-
rithms train on, and show how the data contains biases.
We are not aware of works that study empirically the
transfer of biases from the human programmer to the al-
gorithm, although we have found related ideas mentioned
in recent articles: Silva & Kenney (2019) describe nine
types of biases (present at five different algorithmic stages:
input, algorithmic operations, output, users, and feed-
back), some of which can be studied in conjunction with
the general bias transfer that we demonstrate in this pa-
per (we consider it useful to demonstrate a type of bias
2ACM U.S. Public Policy Council and ACM Europe Policy
Committee (2017). Statement on Algorithmic Transparency and
Accountability. https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/
public-policy/2017_joint_statement_algorithms.pdf
3EU Parliament (2016). EU Framework on algorithmic account-
ability and transparency. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/E-8-2016-007674_EN.pdf
4New York City Council (2018). A Local Law in re-
lation to automated decision systems used by agencies.
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?
ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0
5World Wide Web Foundation (2017). “Algorithmic Account-
ability: Applying the concept to different country contexts”. https:
//webfoundation.org/docs/2017/07/Algorithms_Report_WF.pdf.
through empirical studies as we carry out here). Baeza-
Yates (2018) brings up the users and producers of the web
content as sources of bias related to the data, but also
points out different forms of bias coming from the user
interface made by interaction designers whom could be
regarded as ‘programmers’. We consider it particularly
useful to study empirically the different forms of biases
described by Baeza-Yates (2018) in the light of our hy-
pothesis of ‘bias transfer’ and using methods similar to
what we present in this paper, especially so since the au-
thor recognizes in the conclusion the same general sources
of biases as we study here, i.e.: “each program probably en-
codes the cultural and cognitive biases of their creators”,
and points in the introduction “measuring bias” as a major
challenge, which is what we do here.
To state that algorithms are biased, or to assert that al-
gorithms systematically produce an output that is biased,
must as a consequence lead scholars to pose the question
of whether a biased output could be proven and whether
potential causal mechanisms leading to the bias could also
be tested and studied.
Although an awareness of biases in algorithms has arisen,
including the awareness of biases originating from data,
no research programs seem to have undertaken the aim
to study empirically the (cognitive) mechanisms that may
lead to biases in algorithms, i.e., biases that do not origi-
nate from data itself, but from the programmers’ cultural
backgrounds or from contextual influences in the immedi-
ate programming environment.
Thus, rather than pointing once more to the problem
itself, the present study will instead provide explanations
and insights, derived from our scientific study contain-
ing empirical evidence of actual human programming be-
haviour, into why this phenomenon may occur. We oper-
ate within the same paradigm and with the same agenda
as those who study human behaviour, that is, we follow in
the path of other multidisciplinary research themes such
as Behavioral Economics Tversky & Kahneman (1974);
Kahneman et al. (1991), Behavioral Transportation Re-
search Pedersen et al. (2011); Ga¨rling et al. (2014) and
our own recent contributions termed Behavioral Artificial
Intelligence Pedersen & Johansen (2019) and Behavioural
Computer Science Pedersen et al. (2018).
As mentioned in the introduction, some may argue
that robust quality assurance procedures eliminate any
instances of biases in algorithms, at least in professional
programming environments. We leave out for now test-
ing whether the quality assurance procedures themselves
have inherent biases or miss some forms of biases, and fo-
cus only on proving that programmers may be a source of
biases, and not only the data given to the program.
Because heuristic thinking is seen as the main psycho-
logical “engine” for generating cognitive biases, our exper-
iments will also employ a heuristic approach, that is, rely-
ing on mental shortcuts such as “accessibility/availability”
when inducing a bias on the participants in the study.
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3. A Bias Revealing Cognitive Task
Over the years, the first author has used a simple cog-
nitive task Townsend (2003) (originally called Alice’s Al-
phabet Puzzle) in lectures on judgment and decision mak-
ing. In Townsend’s book, this particular puzzle lists all the
letters in the English alphabet (i.e., latin, roman) on a hor-
izontal line, where straight lined letters are placed above
and curved lined letters are placed below the line. We
changed the puzzle in a vertical position to trigger more
the infinity of the line, and the balance of the sides. The
idea is to make students and professionals in various dis-
ciplines reflect on the possibility that facts that we “see”
in the real world are generally a result of a “theory” of
how we view the world. In the task, the audience is first
shown, as in Figure 2, a correct sequence of the letters A
to G – divided by a vertical line where A, E, and F is on
the left side, and B, C, D, and G is on the right side –
and then asked to decide on which side of the vertical line
(left or right) the next letter H should be placed and why
it should be there.
Figure 2: The puzzle game.
Although some want to place H on the left side of the
line, whereas others want to place it on the right side, when
asked why, they provide distinctly different rationales for
their decision. Their rationales always seem to fall into
three categories, which we categorized as: (I) ‘balance’,
(II) ‘shapes’, or (III) ‘algorithm’. The quintessence of their
arguments are as follows:
I. Some argue that there should be an equal number of
letters on each side of the line: since there are already
four letters on the right side and only three on the
left side, the next letter, H, should go on the left side,
thus indicating a sense of ‘balance’.
II. Others argue that the straight-lined letters A, E, and
F are on the left side of the line, whereas the curved-
shaped letters B, C, D, and G are on the right side,
something which makes it perfectly reasonable that
H should be together with its “kin” on the left side,
given the different ‘shapes’ of the letters.
III. Yet others argue that there is an inherent order (or
pattern) in the sequence: e.g., some indicate the se-
quence Left-1, Right-3, Left-2, Right-4, thus suggest
placing H on the right side due to perceiving the im-
age/puzzle as having the characteristics of an ‘algo-
rithm/pattern’.
This exercise is simple enough to reveal cognitive ten-
dencies of System 1, instead of triggering the System 2
analytical thinking, as usually done by more complicated
tasks. More importantly, the bias cannot be avoided be-
cause there is nothing else in the picture to help them when
making the decision, and any placement is correct; there-
fore only something from the background of the subject,
alternatively, an experimentally induced prime, could help
with making the decision. Moreover, since the subjects
are asked “Why?”, they most often find an explanation in
the memory related to the decision, or make up an expla-
nation after the fact; though sometimes they answer that
they choose at random.
4. Metaphors as Priming Method
We use the above task to force revealing a bias, al-
beit an innocent one (compared to racial or gender), which
would have its origin in the cultural background of the per-
son (e.g., education, line of work, hobbies). This will be
used to test our first main hypothesis that we explained in
the introduction, namely that cultural metaphors would
influence the programmers’ choices. Besides that, in or-
der to test our second hypothesis, we want to test whether
we can prime the subjects to non-consciously make a de-
cision in one specific “direction” – being one of the three
rationales that we identified in Section 3.
Our motivation for hypothesizing that programmers
would non-consciously be affected by the prime, comes
from the well-known effect of the availability heuristic and
the representativeness heuristic, together with the anchor-
ing heuristic Gilovich et al. (2002). Under conditions of
uncertainty, where one does not know, but nevertheless has
to make a judgment or a choice, one will non-consciously
base one’s judgments either on instances that spring eas-
ily to mind (i.e., the cultural background or the contex-
tual prime triggers the availability heuristic), or on in-
stances that resemble the current problem (the cultural
background or the contextual prime triggers the represen-
tativeness heuristic). The judgment can also be anchored
as an approximation to the most recent, the most related
or the most relevant information; the context of the prime
triggers the use of the anchoring heuristic. Thus, as re-
gards cognitive processing, heuristic thinking in System 1
mode is very much an associative reasoning mode influ-
enced by cognitive availability and perceived representa-
tiveness. However, one needs to also consider the content
of the heuristic processing mode, e.g., what is actually eas-
ily accessible in memory. In terms of associative reason-
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ing, the metaphors and metaphorical thinking are a strong
source of influence on how we as humans view the world.
The essence of a metaphor is, according to Lakoff &
Johnson (2008), simply that “we understand and experi-
ence one kind of thing in terms of another”. For example,
an argument may be understood and experienced in terms
of the metaphor war, where we may “attack weak points
in others’ arguments”, we may “shoot down” others’ argu-
ments, and we may “win or lose” arguments. Similarly, we
may perceive the concept of time in terms of the metaphor
money, where we may “waste each other’s time”, or “ save
time”, or even “budget our time”, and “borrow” time. In
fact, metaphors are so pervasive and ubiquitous in our
lives that we simply cannot do without them. Think for
example of how the term “happy” is understood, experi-
enced, and communicated in terms of up, whereas “sad”
is understood in terms of down, showing that affective
states, and even human health, consciousness, or control,
are understood and experienced in terms of directionality.
The good things are up and the bad things are down.
The concept of metaphor, “understanding one kind of
thing in terms of another” as Lakoff and Johnson put it,
particularly the way we perceive the world in terms of
metaphors, is something that can even be manipulated.
Consider for example Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011) study
of the effect of metaphor on the general public’s pref-
erences for crime-prevention measures. When reporting
crime-rates in a fictitious city, crime was either described
in terms of “a beast” or in terms of “a virus”. When ex-
posed to the metaphor crime is a beast, the general public
argued for harsher and more severe crime-preventing mea-
sures than what was the case when they were exposed to
the metaphor crime is a virus. Thus, not only are these
“metaphors that we think with” Lakoff & Johnson (2008)
something that we employ constantly in order to make
sense of the world, but the way we use metaphors to experi-
ence the world is also something that can be manipulated.
This can make us alter our view of the world, and most
of the time we are not aware, neither of the fact that we
think metaphorically, nor that our metaphorical thinking
can be manipulated by governments, media, our employ-
ers, or others, either for commercial or political purposes.
The employment of metaphors, as well as the manipu-
lation of our employment of metaphors, are processes that
mostly go on outside our conscious awareness. Thus, since
metaphorical thinking is so pervasively and ubiquitously
present in our understanding, our experiencing, and our
sense-making of the world, metaphors are exceptionally
well suited for studying how the ultimate purpose of a com-
puter program may be affected both by the programmer’s
cultural metaphors, as well as whether one can influence
the programmer’s initial understanding of the program’s
purpose by a manipulation, i.e., inducing new metaphors
that would alter the initial metaphors that the program-
mer employs.
In the case that the programming specifications are
too sparse to completely fulfill the formal purpose of the
computer program, how does the programmer ‘fill in the
blanks’? We suggest that this is done by employing meta-
phorical thinking, either in terms of ingrained metaphors,
i.e., cultural background, or in terms of cues in the prox-
imate contextual environment that triggers metaphorical
thinking, i.e., our manipulation of contextual metaphors.
4.1. Experimental Manipulation Using Metaphors
The experimental manipulation that we use consists of
three experimental conditions in the form of ‘a story about
a philosopher who invented a puzzle’ which we manipu-
lated by varying the embedment of a different ‘life-aspect’,
i.e., one specific metaphor, forming three different versions
of the story. We also had one control condition, i.e., a story
that did not contain any life-aspects/metaphor, intended
for a comparison to the experimental groups. The three
different life-aspects were:
A. harmony and equality
B. aesthetics and arts
C. order and continuity
The metaphor, which is given in detail below, included
four words, placed in two groups of two words, one in the
beginning of the story, and the other in the end, follow-
ing indications from relevant literature Lakoff & Johnson
(2008); Thibodeau & Boroditsky (2011). The words were:
A. harmony and balance; then equality and fairness
B. aesthetics and beauty; then forms of arts
C. order and structure; then linearity and continuity
We hypothesized that each of the above life-aspects
would metaphorically influence the participants in the re-
spective group A/B/C to provide an explanation that could
be interpreted as one of the rationales from Section 3, re-
spectively rationale I/II/III (i.e., ‘balance’, ‘shapes’, ‘al-
gorithm’).
The metaphorical primes were embedded in the fol-
lowing fictional brief story about the philosopher who was
presented as the one who originally created the puzzle from
Section 3. Each subject will read a story that differs only
in the words shown inside square brackets below, i.e., the
first word pair alternative is provided to Group 1, the sec-
ond pair to Group 2, and the third pair to Group 3.
“A philosopher who lived a life filled with [ har-
mony and balance | aesthetics and beauty | or-
der and continuity ] created the riddle used
in the game that we ask you to imagine that
you program on the next page. Although the
philosopher is nearly forgotten today, we know
that the philosopher influenced many contem-
porary philosophers’ view of the world. The
most prominent influence seems to have been
the importance of maintaining [ equality and
fairness | forms of arts | linearity and continu-
ity ] in life and in society.”
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We also had a control group in order to compare the ef-
fect of the different primes in each of the three experimen-
tal groups to a neutral condition without any metaphor-
priming. In this control group, ‘ethics’ was embedded
in the story, as this concept is unrelated to the three
metaphors. The following story was given to the control
group.
“A philosopher created the riddle used in the
game that we ask you to imagine that you pro-
gram on the next page. Although the philoso-
pher is nearly forgotten today, we know that
the philosopher influenced many contemporary
philosophers’ view of the world. The most promi-
nent influences seem to have been the impor-
tance of ethics in life and society.”
5. Designing the Study
We have spent considerable effort on designing our
studies. Since the hypothesis that we want to test (i.e.,
that programmers can transfer their biases to the program-
ming artefacts) seems to be quite hard to accept (at least
we have seen this as the common reaction), we needed to
build a case backed by strong, data-driven evidence.
First, we incorporate the two instruments that we de-
scribed before, i.e., the bias revealing cognitive task and
the priming metaphor, into a programming task. For now,
we focus on a “paper-task”, where the subject imagines
to be programming, so that we can easily involve non-
programmers, since part of our hypothesis is that in the
near future (if not already so) people with various back-
grounds (outside computer science) would be involved in
various “types of programming”. Examples that we are
aware of include, e.g., “configuration” tasks as when man-
aging a cloud environment with AWS or when using the
IBM’s Watson IoT Platform for building IoT systems from
software components plugged together on a graphical in-
terface; or DSLs (domain specific languages) used in many
disciplines that interact with software; or visual program-
ming languages such as Fraunhofer’s IoT Programming
Language NEPO6 or Google’s Blockly.
We then continue to describe in Section 5.2 the sur-
vey in which we have incorporated the programming task
described in Section 5.1. We explain each of the survey’s
questions and their purposes, as well as our rationale for
“hiding well” the priming metaphor that is hypothesised
to result in a bias. Besides the programming task, the
survey contains additional questions meant to collect in-
formation intended for different purposes, from identifying
6“Fraunhofer IAIS IoT Programming Language NEPO
Roberta R© Lab” by Thorsten Leimbach and Daria Tomala.
In ERCIM News 120, January 2020, Special theme: Educa-
tional Technology. https://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en120/special/
fraunhofer-iais-iot-programming-language-nepo-in-the-open-roberta-lab
‘unserious subjects’, i.e., subjects that did not pay suffi-
cient attention to the task, but instead responded more
or less randomly, to information intended to help with the
interpretation of the subjects’ explanations of their ratio-
nales or their background (see also Section 7).
We carried out our work in two stages. First we per-
formed pilot studies, which we used to learn of flaws and
to make improvements to the design. In this section we
describe the steps and techniques that we used to arrive
at our final studies. In particular, we first carried out
specific usability testing in one pilot survey (described in
Section 5.3). Then we improved the survey by using eye
tracking technology to make sure that the priming is be-
ing read and to see more of how the users/subjects would
interact with the survey (see Section 5.4).
In the second stage, three studies were done in full-scale
with all the planned groups/cohorts from different cultural
backgrounds: people with background in – or/and working
in a field related to – social sciences (psychology), natural
sciences (informatics), and visual arts & design, and per-
forming arts (theatre and music). The results that we re-
port in Section 6 are from these three full-scale studies. We
adapted the questionnaire to the respective target group
of subjects; particularly, after the first full-scale study, we
made a few improvements that helped reduce the number
of uninterpretable and nonsensical answers that needed to
be discarded.
5.1. The Programming Task
We designed a fictitious programming task in which ac-
tual programming was not undertaken during the session,
but where the focus was on the subject’s reasoning about
the programming task. Thus, we informed the subject
that she should place herself in the role of a programmer,
i.e., imagine being the programmer to whom this task is
given to.
The task was to program a game for children where
the image from Figure 2 would be the game board. The
game would consist of the player (which would be different
from the subject/programmer) having to place the next
letter H into one of the two designated empty boxes, i.e.,
on either left/right side of the vertical line. Upon correct
placement, the game (i.e., the programmer) would reward
the player. The boxes designated for placing the letter H
are drawn with a dotted line with a large space between
the dots. This design choice was made in order for the
game to be perceived as continuing downwards and thus
not blocked by a solid and continuous line/box. This was
done to reduce the risk of being confounded by unintended
biases (i.e., in this case, to avoid the subject to perceive
the game board as being finite).
What we gave to the subjects as task description can
be seen as the “requirements” that programmers receive
from their clients (or elicited during a requirements engi-
neering process); sometimes these include, so called, “user
stories”, which are realistic descriptions of the functional-
ity of the software in terms of how a user (in our case, a
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player) would interact/work (in our case, play) with the
software (in our case, the game). Our requirement con-
tains one major intended omission (i.e., it is incomplete)
in that it does not say what would constitute a “correct”
placement of the letter H. In consequence, the subjects (as
the programmer) need to decide for themselves to which
side of the line they should give the reward (i.e., in other
words, we wanted to elicit on which side they would prefer
to place the letter H, themselves). As one can read further
below, the subjects would be asked to explain their choice
in a subsequent question of the survey.
We hypothesized that the uncertainty inherent in the
task would elicit heuristic thinking prompted by either
(i) cultural or (ii) contextual metaphors, in the same way
people are influenced by metaphors in real-life situations.
Specifically, the subjects’ cultural metaphors (from their
cultural background) would influence the choices they would
make in the programming task, and also that contextual
metaphors (coming from our experimental manipulations
described in Section 4) would have the potential to mod-
erate their choices. We expect the choices to be one of the
three different rationales from Section 3, i.e., the ‘balance’,
‘shapes’, or ‘algorithm’ rationale.
In order to introduce the priming metaphor, the game
board image was linked to the story of the philosopher by
saying that this “puzzle” was created by the philosopher.
This link was made after the pilot testing (see details in
the respective subsection below). We hypothesized that,
if the participants were offered a simple explanation of the
origins of the puzzle, then the philosopher story, contain-
ing one of the primes, would prompt the subject to non-
consciously choose an explanation similar to the inherent
rationale in the respective prime.
The task description that we used is the following.
“First, spend one minute imagining how
you would be programming the simple task
below. Then proceed to answer the fol-
lowing questions.
Imagine that you are a non-expert programmer
who is developing a simple puzzle game. The
game is based on a riddle made by the philoso-
pher that you read about previously. Imagine
that you have already drawn the game board
that you can see below:
[The image in Figure 2]
Now you are going to program the player’s in-
teraction with the game.
The player (not you, you are the programmer
of the game) has to solve the puzzle by drag-
and-dropping the letter H on to one of the two
dotted boxes. The player is rewarded if the pro-
gram accepts the placement of the letter H as
the correct placement.”
We want to conceal the bias revealing task behind the
programming task in order to avoid debiasing. We want
that the subjects focus on the programming aspect, and
do not realize that we ask them to make a choice that has
no wrong answer. This is relevant for what we discussed
in 1.2.C.
5.2. The Survey
The survey is created in SurveyMonkey7. The respon-
dents are directed by a link to this online platform to
complete the questionnaire. SurveyMonkey was also used
for the respondents from mTurk. The survey was created
bilingual, in both English and Norwegian; the Norwegian
respondents had the possibility to choose between English
and Norwegian (we considered the possibility of interna-
tional students being enrolled in the studies). Screenshots
of all the pages of the survey are given in Appendix A.
The survey starts with ‘Page 1: Introductory text’, pre-
senting the goal of the survey and how the data is go-
ing to be dealt with. The goal of the experiment is only
partially disclosed, and the true hypothesis remains com-
pletely undisclosed:
“There is now a growing number of program-
mers using programming languages that do not
require programming skills or education. We
are therefore conducting research regarding pro-
gramming done by non-experts and we invite
you to participate in a brief exercise about the
use of natural language to explain the function
of computer programs.”
We did not disclose the fact that we are studying bi-
ases. This nondisclosure was done in order to not influence
the effect of priming and in order not to make subjects
aware that we are interested in the potential relation be-
tween their cultural background and the choices they make
in the programming task. We also inform the subjects
about how long, on average, the completion of the sur-
vey should take and that the study is completely anony-
mous. Since the respondents have various backgrounds,
from other disciplines than computer science, it was also
important to mention that no prior knowledge of com-
puter programming is required for taking part in the sur-
vey/task/exercise.
‘Page 2: Instructions’. contains information that we con-
sider important for the respondents to know before start-
ing the survey. There is also a reason for choosing to have
such guidelines on a separate page, which we will expand
on later in the Section 5.3. The respondents are informed
that:
“The back button is disabled. You will not
be able to go back to a previous question, so
7Platform for creating online surveys: https://www.
surveymonkey.com
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we ask you to read each question carefully,
because some depend on the previous ones.
Please put effort into reading carefully every-
thing on each page.”
Note that some text is being emphasized. In the case
of skim-reading the minimum information the respondent
perceives is: “back button disabled”, “read carefully”, and
“put effort”.
We need the participants to actually read the texts
in the survey for the primes to work and for understand-
ing the requirements in the programming task. For the
mTurk and SurveyMonkey respondents, who were paid,
we also added information about required minimum time
for completion.
‘Page 3: Philosopher story’. contains our story intended
for priming, which we have detailed in Section 4. We ex-
perienced during the pilot test that the participants might
not read a text if the information there cannot be used for
answering questions in the survey. Therefore, we added
one question meant as extra motivation for the respon-
dents to read the text that contained the primes that were
hypothesized to lead to a biased programming choice. (See
Appendix A.)
‘Page 4: Programming task’. contains the text from the
previous Section 5.1 (see also Appendix A). We also added
three questions to this page, partly meant as extra motiva-
tion for the respondents to read the text with the program-
ming task. One of these questions is important because it
is directly related to the bias, i.e., it asks about the place-
ment of the letter H. In order to conceal the importance
of this question we added two more questions completely
irrelevant for our experiment. However, all three questions
are made to look like questions that concern the program-
ming task, i.e., it makes the task realistic. If we would
have left only the question about the choice of placement
then the subject could have observed the missing informa-
tion in the requirements that we gave and thus perceived
the task as less realistic.
‘Page 5: Self explanation of choice’ and ‘Page 6: Alter-
native explanations’. is where the respondents give (or
choose) an explanation for the choices they made in the
programming task. We detail these two pages in the next
subsections.
The rest of the questions on the following pages are
meant to gather more information that could influence the
results of the experiment, i.e., one’s view on life, hobbies,
educational background, and demographics (age, gender).
‘Pages 7: Ranking life-aspects’. where the three alterna-
tives from Section 4 could be ranked. We ask the subjects
to
”Please rank the following three pairs of life-
aspects in the way that best reflects how you
view life yourself (where 1 is the highest while
3 is the lowest).
[ Options: harmony and equality | aesthetics
and arts | order and continuity. ]”
This is a form of self-evaluation, where the subjects
have the chance to express directly their order of preference
for the three instances of priming metaphors (this is done
after they have completed the main task, and they are
not aware that they were themselves randomly exposed to
one of the metaphors). If they rank the prime that they
were exposed to highest, this might indicate that the prime
has had an influence. If so, this would strengthen the
results (i.e., the prime has influenced both programming
and subsequent statements). If they do not rank “their
own” prime highest, this could mean that the prime had
an effect on the programming task, even if it did not have
an effect on the participant’s statements.
The UI for ranking questions is made well by Survey-
Monkey so that when the question is required, then the
subject must indeed provide a ranking, and not just leave
the default, since some action is required before the next
button is enabled (e.g., either provide a ranking number
or move the choices with the mouse).
‘Pages 8: Words suggestions’. where the subjects could
suggest one to three words characterizing each of the three
life-aspects, from the “Ranking life-aspects” question. The
open-ended format chosen for this page has several rea-
sons.
• We wanted to have a way to identify unserious sub-
jects or robot-generated answers (as detailed later in
Section 6.4).
• We also wanted to have another way to check the
metaphorical priming effect by looking whether, and
how often, our priming words appear among the an-
swers.
• We also wanted to gather more data for future stud-
ies; i.e., others could use some of these words in fu-
ture metaphor studies.
‘Pages 9: Demographics’. where the subjects had 5-7 ques-
tions about age, gender, years of education, field of study,
and leisure activities (i.e., hobbies).
In the following section we explain the reasoning be-
hind the way the questions are composed, as a result of
the discoveries we have made during the pilot testing.
5.3. Pilot Testing of Usability
To test the usability of the survey we performed several
pilot tests.
The first pilot test used the method of usability testing
Dumas et al. (1999), with our survey being the product un-
der test. One goal with testing the survey for its usability
is to see whether the explanatory texts, requirements and
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questions are written in a clear and easy-to-understand
language. Moreover, since we intended to prime the sub-
jects, we needed to make certain that the story of the
philosopher (which contained our primes) was read care-
fully and not just skimmed through.
The general goal for this first iteration was to find ob-
vious problems with the survey. The usability study in-
volved five participants. Four of these participants have a
background in computer science and one in arts & design.
Subjects with these two types of backgrounds were going
to be used in our full-scale experiments as well.
The participants were asked to take the survey while
being observed by us, sitting next to them (one of us took
the role of a moderator, while another researcher was only
an observer). The test was run with one participant at
the time. Before taking the survey, the subjects were ex-
plained verbally the purpose with the test session, which
was to help us improve the face-value quality of the sur-
vey, although the hypothesis was not revealed. They were
also presented the order of the tasks: first they were to
take the survey, without any interruption, and then were
supposed to answer questions meant to elicit suggestions
for improvements of the survey.
After a participant completed the survey, s/he was
asked to verbally answer a set of open-ended questions
(post-test questionnaire/interview). The questions listed
below represented the starting point for a discussion where
the participants were free to give comments on the usabil-
ity problems s/he encountered, while the moderator was
recording their comments and asking supporting and clar-
ifying questions.
• Were the questions/tasks easy or difficult
to understand? Which of these?
• Did you find the instructions in the pro-
gramming task clear or confusing?
• Was the text of the questions or explana-
tory text too long or too short? Which of
these?
• Would you have needed/wanted to go back
and read the previous question/texts? In
which case? (we had the back button dis-
abled so that they could not navigate back
to the previous questions).
• How much time did you need to spend on
reading the task about programming the
puzzle? (they were asked to spend 30 sec-
onds before answering the questions re-
lated to the programming task).
• Did you spend more time on certain ques-
tions than on others? Which of these?
Why?
The participants were asked to recall what was ex-
perienced as difficult or unclear by retrospectively going
through each page in the survey and reading again the
content of the page.
The findings were marked with a severity level of high
or medium. An example of a “high severity” is related
to the ‘Ranking life-aspects’ question where the partici-
pants were asked to rank the three pairs of life-aspects.
We wanted the participants to do the rating so that it re-
flects their own way of viewing life, but in the first pilot
we did not emphasize this. By not specifying this, the
subjects’ answers could potentially reflect their perceived
view of others. In the case of one participant, s/he chose
the answer that reflected the view of the philosopher pre-
sented in the story on the second page, as s/he surmised
that this is what we might have wanted.
In general the findings from this first pilot test helped
with shortening and simplifying the text and making the
requirements/questions more clear.
The test also helped with validating our initial deci-
sion of disabling the back button in the survey. For the
priming to work, the participants should not realize the
connection between their choice in the programming task
and the ‘Philosopher story’. If the participants would un-
derstand at a later stage in the survey that such a connec-
tion existed, they should not be allowed to navigate back
and read the ‘Philosopher story’ again. In this pilot study
one of the participants had the back button purposely left
enabled. This participant did just what we expected, s/he
navigated back to the ‘Philosopher story’, read it again,
and adjusted her/his answers to reflect the view of the
philosopher and not her/his own as the question required.
Another observation from this first pilot test was that
on the ‘Philosopher story’ page the participants scrolled
down quickly to the questions and then read only the part
of the text that helped them to answer those questions.
This was however difficult to establish with accuracy only
through observation and the participants might not want
to recognize that they did not put enough effort into read-
ing the whole text. Only one of them acknowledged that.
We concluded that the best way to reveal the exact be-
haviour that the participants have in reading the informa-
tion, and also which flow they follow, was by using eye
tracker technology Bojko (2013).
5.4. Eye Tracking for Better Insights
We created two versions of the ‘Philosopher story’ – a
‘Short story’ (Figure 3a) and a ‘Long story’ (Figure 3b).
We employed summative research8 in combination with
eye tracking methods for comparing the two versions and
deciding which was more effective.
The test was done in a usability laboratory set up with
eye tracking equipment. The survey was displayed to the
participants on a desktop computer to which a remote eye-
tracker was attached. Using a remote type of eye-tracker,
8Summative research implies comparing an interface or product
to its other versions, competitors, or benchmarks Bojko (2013).
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(a) ‘Short story’. (b) ‘Long story’.
Figure 3: The ‘Philosopher story’ tested with eye tracking.
required to calibrate the device before starting the test-
ing with each of the participants, as well as instructing
the participants to find a comfortable and stable position
which to maintain during the whole testing, so to avoid
head and especially body movement. To test the effective-
ness of the two versions, a combination of single-subject
and between-subject design was used, where each partic-
ipant (ten in total) was exposed to only one of the test
stimuli – five to the ‘Short story’ and five to the ‘Long
story’. This was to avoid any carryover effects between
the stories. For their help, the participants (students from
Karlstad University) received a small reward in terms of a
coupon usable in the student cafeteria.
Both stories contained the same priming words. The
‘Long story’ was created with the purpose of helping the
reader to immerse in the story – by giving more back-
ground information on the philosopher – and prepared the
participant for the task on the next page of the survey, the
‘Programming task’. Since we intended to prime the sub-
ject, we needed to hide the priming words well in the story,
so that unintended debiasing (e.g., reactance) would not
occur. At the same time, a too long story could make the
subject not read the whole text and thus possibly skip the
priming words. A shorter version of the story would also
reduce the cognitive burden on the subject. The eye track-
ing testing was thus meant to help us identify whether the
subjects skip our priming words, and also how much cog-
nitive effort (i.e., how much time) they puts into reading
the stories.
The heatmaps and gase plots visualizations9 provided
both spatial and temporal insight into how the participants
interacted with the text on each page of our survey. We
obtained information about which areas of the text were
fixated and for how long, the number of fixations and the
order in which the fixations occurred. More specifically,
we obtained insight into which lines and words were read,
whether some of these were reread, and also how many
times.
Interpreting this data we concluded that there was no
noticeable difference in how the text, and especially the
priming words, were read between the long and short ver-
sion of the story. For both cases, the participants read the
text thoroughly, line by line (Figure 4).
This shows that the instruction on the ‘Philosopher
story’ page about reading the story “carefully” had the
wished effect. Thus, this requirement was carried over to
the full-scale experiments as well. The difference between
the reading of the two stories was that the long one re-
quired more time and effort, 1:10 minutes compared to 40
9The gaze was offset vertically by approximately one line. This
was due to the mismatch between the Operating System version and
the version of Eye tracking software at the time of testing. The
offset has been consistent across the participants and did not affect
our interpretations.
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Figure 4: Heat map with offset gaze.
seconds for the short one. Reducing cognitive load and
time by almost 50 percent would be of help to the sub-
jects, and thus we decided to use the ‘Short story’ in our
full-scale studies.
Another aspect that we analysed with the help of eye
tracking was whether the question about the philosopher
being a man or a woman works as extra motivation for the
participants to read the story. We found out that in order
to answer this question, the participants returned to read-
ing the story several times. In addition to the motivational
aspect, questions such as this one will help in drawing po-
tential attention away from the true hypotheses.
We also tracked the reading of the ‘Instructions’ text,
as this is where we ask the participants to “put effort into
reading” the texts in the survey. During the eye tracking
phase, the instructions were part of the ‘Introductory text’
page, as a separate paragraph at the end of the page, sep-
arated by the rest of the text by a capitalized and empha-
sized header “instructions” (Figure 5). In addition, we
also included a sentence at the start of the ‘Philosopher
story’ asking the respondents: “Please read carefully
the story below:”, again with capitalized and emphasized
letters (Figure 3).
The findings from the recordings revealed that one par-
ticipant did not read the instructions text, but only looked
at the words “instructions” and “put effort”. These words
were standing out through their typography design. This
participant was found to not put effort in several other
places. Three of the participants were only reading parts
of the instructions, while the remaining six were reading
carefully, line by line. In a laboratory context the partic-
ipants are known to be putting in more effort than they
might do on their own in other more natural contexts.
By analysing the behaviour exhibited by the partici-
pants in reading the instructions on both pages, we con-
cluded that we should create a dedicated page for the in-
structions, just before the ‘Philosopher story’ where we
should include the “put effort into reading” text. Thus,
we drew attention to the importance of the instructions by
creating a separate page for them. Here we also included
the “... put effort into reading carefully ...” text, in or-
der to avoid repeating it on the ‘Philosopher story’ page.
This was done with the intention of preventing the possi-
bility of the participants guessing our priming intention by
marking the story as something to pay special attention to.
We also decided to typographically emphasize the impor-
tant words or sentences used for instructions throughout
the whole survey, as we have seen that they are always
read by the participants.
6. Performing the Study
6.1. The Participants
Here, we describe the reasons behind the way we chose
and grouped our subjects, and how the different cohorts of
participants are meant to help study the research questions
that we elaborated on in the Introduction.
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Figure 5: Image of one of the recordings, watched in half of the real speed, showing that the instructions were carefully read, with an even
distribution of fixations.
The participants were chosen based on their educa-
tional or occupational background, to span three main ed-
ucational and professional domains, which is relevant for
the 1.2.A aspect presented in the Introduction. This is also
meant to cover well different computer programming skill
levels as well as socio-cultural influences, properties and
preferences. We reason that, when enrolled in a certain
study line or field of work, people have already developed
predominant skills and characteristics needed for the spe-
cific education or occupation.
We will thus talk about three main cohorts of respon-
dents:
A. ‘Social sciences’ cohort – composed of students study-
ing psychology;
B. ‘Natural sciences’ cohort – composed of students study-
ing computer science; and
C. ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort – composed of a group of
participants working in the field of arts and design, a
group of students studying theatre, and another group
studying music. The last two subgroups we term the
‘Cultural studies’ participants.
This categorization based on the educational and pro-
fessional background of the respondents is confirmed by
the analysis of the data obtained from the control ques-
tion on the ‘Demographics’ page, i.e., specifically about
which field of study or/and line of work the respondents
affirm their background to be mainly consistent with.
Based on the conditions to which the respondents were
exposed, we can also categorise the three cohorts into:
I. ‘not helped’ and ‘not confined’,
II. ‘helped’ and ‘not confined’,
III. ‘helped’ and ‘confined’.
The ‘confined’ or ‘not confined’ categorization describes
the environment where the respondents were at the time of
taking the survey. The ‘not confined’ respondents took the
survey in the environment of their choice, which was un-
known to us, whereas ‘confined’ means taking the survey
in a more controlled environment (i.e., the university audi-
torium). The ‘helped’ or ‘not helped’ classification refers
to whether the respondents were supported or not by be-
ing given alternative explanations to pick from, in order
to explain their choice for the placement of the letter ‘H’.
Starting with the second full-scale study we introduced an
extra page in the survey, offering such alternative expla-
nations with possible answers to choose from, meant to
reduce the number of uninterpretable answers. The re-
spondents that were given the ‘Alternative explanations’
to help them with explaining their choice are termed as
‘helped’. The ‘Social sciences’ cohort belongs to the ‘non
helped’ and ‘not confined’ category (I), as the survey they
were given did not contain the ‘Alternative explanations’
page and they could take the survey at the time and place
of their choice. In the case of the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort
we had a combination of ‘helped/confined’ and ‘helped/not
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confined’ (II, III) with a predominance of the latter. The
mTurk and SurveyMonkey respondents were helped with
‘Alternative explanations’ and were free to choose the envi-
ronment where to take the survey. The ‘Cultural studies’
students were also ‘helped’ but confined to a classroom,
where the course leader and one of the authors were also
present. Similarly, the ‘Natural sciences’ cohort was both
‘helped’ and ‘confined’ (III) as the survey was taken as
part of their regular course-work. The ‘confined’ / ‘not
confined’ and ‘helped’ / ‘not helped’ are categories that
are going to be used for analysing the sensical vs. nonsen-
sical data in Section 7.1.
The environment of the participants and the support
they received is related to three main types of environment
where (future) programming activities can take place in:
A. Typical professional programming environment, where
the programmer is ‘confined’ to an office space and has
to her disposal all the professional resources necessary
to fulfill her tasks. In our case, for the programming
task and the required explanations, we tried to repro-
duce this type of environment for the group of com-
puter science students, by both confining them to the
classroom and course hours and offering them helping
answers.
B. Semi-professional environment, where an expert in some
technical field (other than programming, e.g., railway
engineering) has professional tool support for simple
programming/configuration, e.g., by using a GUI based
programming tool or a graphical programming lan-
guage s.a. Blockly. However, programming is not their
main task or responsibility and thus are not supposed
to put too much effort into it, which we consider as ‘not
confined’. The mTurk and SurveyMonkey respondents
were thus ‘not confined’ but ‘helped’.
C. Non-professional environment, where people, e.g, in
their homes, are configuring an IoT system without any
professional support nor prior knowledge. The ‘Social
sciences’ respondents were neither ‘helped’ nor ‘con-
fined’, and can thus be seen to some extent as fitting
this profile.
For the purpose of studying the influence of the contextual-
metaphor priming, we further group the respondents from
each cohort by the priming they have been exposed to (or
not), according to Section 4.1:
A. a control group which is not primed in any way,
B. a group primed as in Section 4.1.A (which we call,
‘primed with harmony and equality’),
C. a group primed as in Section Section 4.1.B (i.e., with
‘aesthetics and arts’), and
D. a group primed as in Section 4.1.C (i.e., with ‘order
and continuity’).
The control group is meant to serve as a baseline to ob-
serve what the programmers’ preferences for task-solutions
are in the absence of primes, i.e., when presented with a
description that is neutral with regard to the task at hand
and the task’s inherent possible solutions. This is relevant
for our first main question.
The three primed groups are meant to help us test
whether the bias can be induced upon the programmer,
and subsequently transferred from the programmer to the
algorithms. This is relevant for our second main research
question presented in the Introduction and the aspects dis-
cussed in 1.2.D.
The cohort with students from the computer science
study line is meant to help us test whether programmers
shut away the other two biases, i.e., resulting from the
cultural metaphor or the induced contextual metaphor,
except the pattern/infinite way of thinking, which is some-
times assumed that the programmers do. This is relevant
for what we discussed in 1.2.B and 1.2.E.
We also collect information about the hobbies, years
of higher-education, age and gender of the participants.
The hobbies and years of higher-education are meant to
help with fine-graining the analysis of the educational and
occupational background of the participants. The age data
is presented in the Section 7, with the purpose of giving
an overview of the population distribution. We also look
for indications of whether the bias is more pronounced in
different age categories, and if this is reflected in how much
it is transferred into the program.
6.2. Methods Employed
The main research hypothesis to be tested is whether
biases can be transferred from the programmer to the pro-
gram. This hypothesis is tested throughout all our three
experimental cohort-studies, and it contributes to answer-
ing our first main question from the Introduction.
The studies employ a combination of experimental de-
sign and comparative design. In the analyses of both (i)
the comparative aspect (i.e., differences between the three
cohorts) and (ii) the experimental aspect (i.e. (differences
within each cohort, resulting from the experimental ma-
nipulation), we employed both (a) inferential statistics,
more specifically chi-square analyses of categorical data, as
well as (b) descriptive statistics to report frequencies and
percentages. We performed an experiment on each cohort,
as well as compared the three cohorts to each other, re-
gardless of the experimental manipulation. Since the three
cohorts were different in terms of cultural and educational
background, we were able to study the unique effect of
background per se.
Conforming to the true experimental design method
Lazar et al. (2017); Cook et al. (2002), we first assigned
the participants of each cohort randomly to one of three ex-
perimental conditions where we induced one specific type
of contextual metaphorical thinking in each, or to a control
condition containing neither of the three primes. The con-
trol condition contained the neutral non-prime story from
the end of Section 4.1 and was meant to serve as a “base-
line” to establish whether the participants, without being
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primed, were inclined to favor one of the three “rationales”
over the other.
The subjects are given the programming exercise de-
scribed in Section 5.1. The programming task, the edu-
cational/professional background of the subjects, and the
story containing the primes, are the independent variables
in our experiment. The choice of what will be the right
solution for the puzzle is the dependent variable. We are in-
terested in finding out if the primes and the background of
the participants (the independent variables) induce changes
in how the puzzle is programmed (the dependent variable),
following the rationale that it is the programmer who de-
cides to give the player a prize based on what she (i.e., the
programmer) thinks qualifies as the right answer.
The conditions (also known as treatments) that we in-
tend to compare are reflected in the explanations that the
subjects provide, being under the influence of three con-
textual metaphor primes and three types of cultural back-
ground.
A true experiment requires randomization and con-
trolled trials (Randomized Controlled Trial – RCT), as
well as one or more distinct experimental manipulations.
First, our study conforms to these requirements due to ran-
dom assignment of each participant to the four conditions
(i.e., three experimental conditions and one control condi-
tion). Second, the experimental conditions are controlled
and kept constant to the extent that we recorded the time
spent on the tasks and thus ensured that the tasks were
completed within a reasonable time-frame. Thus, we ex-
cluded the effect of any seriously potentially confounding
variables, such as diffusion of experimental manipulations
(i.e., we reduced the possibility of participants sharing the
contents of the tasks with other participants). Participants
completed the task individually and received identical in-
structions. In addition, the hypotheses were not revealed
to the participants. Such non-disclosure of hypotheses is
the most robust experimental procedure, and it is em-
ployed in around 87 percent of all experimental-psychology
research Hertwig & Ortmann (2008) because it allows for
the elicitation of valid measures of behaviour instead of
relying on less valid measures by means of other meth-
ods, s.a. self-reports Bro¨der (1998); Christensen (1988);
Kimmel (1998); Kron (1998); Trice (1986); Weiss (2001).
For analysing the second main hypothesis that we pro-
posed in the Introduction, pertaining to the potential in-
fluence of the context, i.e., metaphors in the programming
environment, the research hypothesis is that the manipula-
tion (“prime”) will increase the number of the correspond-
ing explanations the participants give. In the event that
the number of explanations does not increase as a result of
the prime, we discard the research hypothesis and retain
the null hypothesis.
Supporting evidence of whether the prime has induced
a specific metaphorical thinking and thus has produced a
biased judgment in the prime’s direction should be shown
in the participants’ explanations, given after they have fin-
ished the programming task. The participants’ explana-
tions for their respective choices were qualitatively coded
according to the three predefined categories. Explanations
conforming to one of the three predefined categories were
categorized both according to their discrete category (i.e.,
‘balance’, ‘shapes’ or ‘algorithm’) as well as whether they
were ‘sensical’ (i.e., eligible for inclusion in the predefined
categories) or ‘nonsensical’. Non-interpretable explana-
tions were thus labeled ‘nonsensical’ and discarded (see
Section 7.1 for a thorough analysis of this). We coded the
explanations qualitatively and categorized them into one
of the three possible rationales. If the rationale of prime-
manipulation in the respective condition is chosen signif-
icantly more than the other rationales, this would imply
that the participants were influenced by external features
that are not relevant to the programming task itself.
We implemented one additional variable to control for
the bias, and this stemmed from our assumption, resulting
from an observation in our practical use of the cognitive
task from Section 3, that the choice of placing the letter H
is also an indication of the rational. Particularly, partic-
ipants choosing Left would be those using the rationales
I,II from Section 3 for ‘balance’ or ‘shapes’ (similarly those
primed with the life-aspects A,B from Section 4); whereas
participants choosing Right would be those using the ra-
tionale III for ‘algorithm’ (similarly those primed with C).
This is analyzed in Subsection 8.1.
We choose the subjects based on their educational and
professional background. However, in the questionnaire we
ask the participants to provide information about their ed-
ucational background themselves (because some have mul-
tiple) as well as information about their preferred free-time
activities. This is done in order to disclose a possible re-
lation between this particular aspect of the background
of the participants and their choices in the programming
task. Moreover, this information from free-text questions
can also help detect respondents that did not relate se-
riously to the task, as well as to control our qualitative
coding of their explanations and background.
We hypothesize that the results from the analyses will
show a statistically significant relation between (i) cultural
metaphors (i.e., the subjects’ cultural background) or (ii)
contextual metaphors (i.e., the experimental prime) and
the choices made (and the explanations provided) regard-
ing the programming task. The majority of the answers
are expected to fall in one of these three categories: biased
by the prime only, biased by the background only, or bi-
ased by both. If neither of this is the case, our hypotheses
are discarded, and we conclude that biases are not being
transferred from the programmer to the program.
6.2.1. Alternative Explanatory Variables
The age and gender of the participants are analysed as
alternative explanatory variables.
Other alternative explanatory variables that might oc-
cur could result from the subjects not understanding the
task well, the task being too difficult, or the prime not be-
ing strong enough as a result of superficial reading. How-
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ever, these factors were something that we detected and
removed through our pilot tests.
The nature of our study requires an (i) experimental
and (ii) comparative between-group design, where each par-
ticipant in the experimental part is only subjected to one
experimental condition. In the comparative part of the de-
sign, the three cohorts represent three distinctly different
cultures. Thus we were able to study the potential effect of
both the cultural metaphors and the contextual metaphors
on programming choices as two different sources of bias.
In order to effectively exclude the potentially confus-
ing noise caused by the individual differences that may
occur in small samples, as well as potentially nonsensical
explanations that would need to be discarded, we decided
to use a sufficient number of participants in each condi-
tion. Thus, we assigned at least ten participants from
each cohort to each condition in order to arrive at least at
five sensical output-explanations and thus conform to the
conventional requirements of chi-square comparisons, i.e.,
including at least five participants in each group.
We believe, however, that the individual differences will
not affect the study results to a large extent. By imple-
menting the questionnaire questions related to individual
preferences and extracurricular activities (‘Ranking life-
aspects’ and ‘Words suggestions’ pages, and the question
about hobbies on the ‘Demographics’ page), we expect to
be able to clearly identify if the choice was dictated by
the bias. Moreover, the programming task is thought to
be very simple, thus requiring very little cognitive effort.
For such cases, it is empirically proven that the individ-
ual differences have a smaller impact Lazar et al. (2017).
For the same reason, i.e., reducing the factors influenc-
ing the main conditions to be compared in the experi-
ment, the groups of respondents were composed of respon-
dents studying/working in the same field, something which
reduces potentially confounding individual differences at
least to some extent.
6.2.2. Ethical Aspects
All three full-scale studies were done with the responses
being anonymized. All answers are registered on the ran-
dom ID that the system generates. It is thus not possible
to identify any of the respondents.
6.3. Learning from the First Full-scale Study
The first full-scale study, also referred to as the ‘Social
sciences’ cohort, consists of undergraduate students en-
rolled in a psychology study program. The link to the sur-
vey on SurveyMonkey was sent through email by the study
program administrators and resulted in 77 responses. Ob-
servations made after the first study helped with improv-
ing the following studies. An analysis of the incomplete
responses (31 out of 77) from the first study shows that: 6
dropped out right away; 12 dropped out on the ‘Program-
ming task’ page; 6 on the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page;
5 on the page with ‘Words suggestions’ page; and 2 on the
‘Demographics’ page. The dropout rates are respectively
19.4%, 38.7%, 19.4%, 16.1%, and 6.5% (i.e., Figure 6).
Figure 6: Overview of the dropout number – frequencies and per-
centages – of respondents from the ‘Social sciences’ cohort; including
the names of the pages where the dropout happened.
The high number of dropouts on the ‘Programming
task’ page could be explained by the fact that the stu-
dents in this cohort are studying psychology and they may
have never been exposed to computer programming, thus
they may have deemed this task as not relevant, not in-
teresting, or maybe too difficult. Based on this reasoning,
in the second study, also referred to as the ‘Natural sci-
ences’ cohort, we introduced on the first page more text
where we explain that “It is not required to have any prior
knowledge of computer programming.”; moreover, on the
‘Programming task’ page we wrote that the puzzle is sim-
ple, i.e., ”... who is developing a simple puzzle game”.
Another solution for further motivating the respon-
dents to finish the survey was to add a progress bar in-
dicating how much of the survey was left until completion.
For the last three pages we also added a page-footer in-
forming, consecutively, that ‘there are three, two, and one
pages left’, i.e., aiming to reduce the two latter types of
dropouts.
Recall that the first study was conducted with volun-
teer social science students that were neither paid nor par-
ticipating during their normal class hours. In contrast, the
second study was run in a lecture hall, before the break,
as part of a first year computer science course. In the case
of mTurk and SurveyMonkey respondents from the third
study, also referred to as the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort
(see Section 6.4), we consider the payment as an impor-
tant motivating factor.
To reduce the cognitive effort required for explaining
the choice for the ‘H’ letter placement on the ‘Self expla-
nation of choice’ page we added, immediately after this
page, an additional page called ‘Alternative explanations’,
containing a list of predefined explanations to choose from.
This was meant to reduce the high dropout rate that we
saw on the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page. Moreover,
adding these alternatives in the second study reduced the
number of uninterpretable answers significantly. A de-
tailed analysis of the uninterpretable answers (i.e., expla-
nations) is done in the Section 7.
For the second study, the total number of responses
received was 53. Of this total number, one respondent
dropped out on the ‘Programming task’, one on the ‘Self
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explanation of choice’, one on the ‘Ranking life-aspects’,
and two on the ‘Words suggestions’ page. In total there
were five dropouts. The small number of dropouts in this
second study indicates that the adjustments made after
the first study were successful.
Regarding the language in the first study, the students
could choose between English and Norwegian. The ma-
jority of participants in the first cohort were Norwegian
speakers. Nevertheless, some of the students could be, for
example, exchange students and thus more comfortable
with English than Norwegian, therefore an English ver-
sion was made available as well. Though we did not have
any students choosing the English version in this case, we
encountered three such cases in the second study, testify-
ing to the relevance of providing both a Norwegian and
an English version. Moreover, the English version of the
survey was necessary for the mTurk and SurveyMonkey
respondents in the third study.
6.4. Transitioning from Volunteering Students to Profes-
sional Respondents
For the third cohort, we planned to recruit people with
a background in arts and culture in general. We intended
to continue with the same style of set-up as in the second
study, where the respondents take the survey during their
course, confined to a classroom. It proved difficult to find
a large number of respondents to comply with these re-
quirements. We started the third study with two groups
of students, studying music and theatre. Though we had
no dropouts from these groups10, the numbers of students
in the classes were too small (which is specific to these
kinds of studies), i.e., 10 respondents from music and 10
from theatre. To increase the number of responses we
decided to recruit respondents through specialized plat-
forms, specifically through the Amazon Mechanical Turk
and SurveyMonkey. These would no longer be volunteers
but professional respondents, i.e., who are paid for their
participation and do such tasks often.
The data from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk)11
comes from three batches. The first batch of respondents
were chosen based on the following qualification require-
ments: working in the Arts & Design field and having a
Masters qualification12. The respondents in this first batch
were rewarded $2 plus fees $1.35 (Mechanical Turk Fee:
$0.80, Masters Fee: $0.10, US High School Graduate Fee:
$0.05, Job Function – Arts & Design: $0.40). The reward
sum was decided based on what other requesters on mTurk
were paying, which was generally under $1. We received
10Only one incomplete answer was removed, which was the re-
sponse of the course tutor that wanted to scrutinize our survey.
11Amazon Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing marketplace.
https://www.mturk.com/
12A Master Worker is a top Worker of the mTurk marketplace that
has been granted the Mechanical Turk Masters Qualification. These
Workers have consistently demonstrated a high degree of success in
performing a wide range of HITs across a large number of Requesters.
only one response. Therefore, we increased the reward to
$3 (plus appropriate fees) and reopened the mTurk HIT.
However, this second batch brought only three additional
responses. The number of respondents with the wished
qualifications proved to be small, irrespective of the remu-
neration. In a third batch we kept only the job function
– Arts & Design – requirement, and the same payment
of $3. This generated 115 responses, which was close to
the number of respondents we were aiming for (i.e., 100
respondents).
The respondents in this batch come from the mTurk.
However, given that the questionnaire was already made
in SurveyMonkey, we directed the mTurk respondents to
SurveyMonkey through a link. There is a mismatch be-
tween the number of respondents registered in mTurk (115
plus four from the first two batches) and SurveyMonkey
(128). This is due to the fact that we rejected (and not
paid) some of the respondents, and thus their places were
reopened in mTurk for new respondents, but SurveyMon-
key kept generating new IDs, recording also those that we
have rejected in mTurk.
We asked the respondents (i.e., in the “Instructions”
section of the survey) to spend at least eight minutes on
their response and read all text with attention. However,
quick readers could have managed to complete the survey
in no less than four minutes. The respondents that spent
less than four minutes could not have spent the necessary
time on reading the texts in the survey and their answers
cannot be considered reliable. This was established also
by checking the answers in the open fields, where we could
see how much effort the respondent put into writing an
explanation on the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page and
giving examples of words on the ‘Words suggestions’ page.
Thus, from the total of 128 responses registered in Sur-
veyMonkey, collected from all three batches, we removed
13 respondents that spent less than four minutes on com-
pleting the survey. Additionally, seven more respondents
were rejected as we deemed them unserious (e.g., computer
generated answers). Out of the remaining 108 responses,
one participant dropped out on the ‘Self explanation of
choice’ page.
Moreover, six respondents that spent more than four
minutes were still deemed unreliable and thus removed
from the analysis. This was decided based on the quality
of the responses given in the open-ended questions. Some
examples of such ‘unserious’ answers are:
• One respondent (M:11270629093, from the third co-
hort) spent 18:44 minutes, but his/her answers on
the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page was “none”,
whereas for the ‘Words suggestions’ question the an-
swers seemed to be generated by a computer: answer
“the intimately transmitted from west to east” for
life-aspect ‘harmony and equality’ (from Sec. 4.1.A);
answer “Aesthetics is branch of philosophy that ex-
amines the nature” for life-aspect ‘aesthetics and
arts’ (from Sec. 4.1.B); answer “the Alternatively,
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this is called first-order parametric continuity” for
life-aspect ‘order and continuity’ (from Sec. 4.1.C).
• Another respondent (M:11270932685, third cohort)
spent 11:00 minutes, but did not give any explana-
tion on the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page, and
for the ‘Words suggestions’ question wrote “just my
opinion”, and for the ‘Field of study/line of work’
question on the ‘Demographics’ page answered with
“Letters of the words and Line”.
To the mTurk batch we also added the responses from
the study run with SurveyMonkey respondents and with
the respondents from the Culture studies.
In the case of the SurveyMonkey, we requested 50 re-
spondents to be working in the field of Arts and Design.
The country of origin of these participants was chosen to
be Sweden. With the purpose of reaching the number
of respondents having the required qualifications that we
asked for, SurveyMonkey created two collectors:
(a) The first collector generated 39 qualified responses re-
munerated with SEK 8,982.8 in total, and SEK 230.32
per response.
(b) The second collector generated 11 qualified responses
remunerated with NOK 2,332.77 in total, and NOK
212.07 per response.
Out of these 50 respondents we removed 15 that spent
under 4 minutes on completing the survey. Out of the re-
maining 35 respondents we further removed 13 unserious
answers. These answers were deemed as unserious based
on the evaluation of the answers in the open-field ques-
tions, e.g.: the participant with the ID: S:11174871215
(from the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort) answered “a e f fits
my eye” on the ‘Self explanation of choice’ page and “now
/ now / nos”, “1 / 3 / 2”, “People love us / Color field tree
/ Lamp tide dog” on the ‘Words suggestions’ page. Out
of the remaining 22, two of the answers were incomplete,
with one respondent that dropped out on the ‘Ranking
life-aspects’ page and another on the ‘Self explanation of
choice’ page.
7. Analysing the Data
All the examples of answers from participants are pre-
sented by us here in English, but many of them are trans-
lations from Norwegian (including grammar corrections;
though not for the English ones, which are kept verbatim,
including their grammatical errors).
7.1. Sensical vs. Nonsensical Answers
The participants’ explanations (i.e., their written texts)
were analyzed qualitatively and coded into one of the three
rationales from Section 3 (i.e., Section 3.I ‘balance,’ Sec-
tion 3.II ‘shapes’, or Section 3.III ‘algorithm’) depending
on the fit between the text and the category. During the
first full-scale study we found one answer (pID 38, first co-
hort) which triggered us to introduce another category or
rationales, called ‘sounds’; the answer explained the choice
of letter placement as “If you sing the alphabet in Norwe-
gian then the best fit with the rhythm is to place ‘H’ to
the left, because you have a small pause before singing ‘H’
after ‘G’.”.
There were still many answers that could not be cate-
gorized into the above, either because they did not make
much sense, or the reason given was no reason at all. How-
ever, many of these answers were recurrent, transcending
even the language differences, and this allowed us to group
them in categories. Some of the more generic answers were
so similar between English and Norwegian that we could
regard them as ‘universal’.
• ‘Logical’ : “I think it would be logical put the H in the
right position” (pID M:11272137574, third cohort);
or “Left seems right because it seems logical” (pID
53, first cohort); or “because it seemed most logical”
(pID 12, first cohort).
• ‘Pattern’ : “My choice was made by what I thought
was a pattern” (pID M:11282013578, third cohort);
or “because of the order of the previous ones.” (pID
47, first cohort); or “Due to previous placements
above.” (pID 50, first cohort); or “The left seems to
follow the pattern” (pID M:11270235127, third co-
hort); or ”Because I think the pattern follows that
path.” (pID 4, first cohort).
• ‘Random’ : ”Just chose something” (pID 33, first
cohort); or “It seemed like the pattern of the let-
ters would place the H on the right, but there isn’t
enough information for me to decide, so it is kind of
a guess.” (pID M:11270119183, third cohort).
• ‘Alphabet”: “...going in reverse alphabetical order.”
(pID M:11272389655, third cohort); or “The letters
are to be placed based on the alphabet song.” (pID
M:11271323609, third cohort).
• ‘Handed’ : “I’m right handed so I favor my right side
and it just seemed like the ‘correct’ answer to me.”
(pID M:11271930008, third cohort); or “Most peo-
ple are right-handed, so dragging the letter to the
right felt like an automatic default action. Dragging
it to the left requires a more deliberate choice.” (pID
M:11270365264, third cohort); or “I chose the right
because in every day society its pretty common for
the right side of thing to be accepted as good, such as
right handed people, the right hand of god, etc etc.
I also chose the right side because its ‘right’.” (pID
M:11270469031, third cohort).
• ‘No reason’ : “Because it looked most natural com-
pared to what has already been done.” (pID 36, first
cohort); or “it looked natural” (pID 7, first cohort);
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or “It felt reight” (pID S:11178992036, third cohort);
or “Seems better” (pID S:11174871629, third cohort).
• ‘micro-balance’ : “H on the right side follows the pat-
tern of the EF on the left side, which are a pair.”
(pID M:11272137574, third cohort); or “Because it
makes sense to me that H and G are grouped to-
gether, since there is a grouping on the other side as
well.” (pID T:11058678726, third cohort); or “In my
opinion it looks nicer to have ‘H’ after ‘G’. It has a
bit to do with how ‘E’ and ‘F’ are positioned.” (pID
T:11058678669, third cohort).
To reduce the number of uninterpretable answers (i.e.,
explanations, rationales), starting with the second full-
scale survey, we introduced the alternative answers that
respondents could choose from; see Figure A.23 in the Ap-
pendix A. These alternatives were formulated based on the
wordings that we encountered among the responses from
the first study. Thus, the first study provided a type of
‘saturation’ of alternatives. As a result of coding and cat-
egorization we arrived at five alternative answers, as well
as a sixth and seventh alternative: “I just chose some-
thing” and “I already gave an explanation”13. We also
used these to help us code the answers, i.e. when they did
not give any explanation (it was not required) but instead
chose from our list, we used that choice as the rationale.
When they gave an explanation that did not make sense,
but then also chose one of our example explanations, we
again used the one that they chose, for our categorization.
There was also the case when their explanation somewhat
seemed to contradict the choice that they picked. In this
case, we still used the choice for the categorization. The
following are a few explanations that made no sense, but
an alternative was chosen: “The left side seems like the log-
ical, correct side when compared with the letters that came
before it.” (pID M:11270382691, third cohort) but then
chose the alternative answer that sounded “Because of the
appearance/form of the letters. On the left side they have
straight lines, whereas on the right side are rounded.”;
or “I choose left because i think it can be very good with
random letters in the left.” (pID M:11270101280, third
cohort) but then chose the alternative “The same number
of letters on each side.”; or “There seems to be a pattern.
Placing the letter on the left makes the most sense to con-
tinue that pattern.” (pID M:11271499180, third cohort)
but then chose a pattern from the alternative that sounded
“It creates a pattern of the type: 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, . . . or 1-3-2,
1-3-2, . . . or 1-3-2, 2-3-1, . . . ”.
We thus define as Sensical those answers that were in-
terpretable and allowed for category inclusion in one of the
three rationales from Section 3, and we define as Nonsen-
sical the remainder of the answers, both those that made
13Recall that this was a ‘required’ question/page (marked with *),
as opposed to the previous ‘Self explanation of choice’ page, and
thus a choice must be made on this page.
no sense at all, as well as those that could be coded as
‘sounds’ which were very few in number (i.e., one in the
‘Social sciences’ cohort, one in the ‘Natural sciences’ co-
hort, and five in the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort, all of which
did not involve our helper alternatives, but their explana-
tions that described the reason as ‘sound’).
In the following we make two observations about our
sensical vs. nonsensical perspective on the responses.
7.1.1. Helping with the Self-explanations
The first regards the level of help that the different co-
horts received. We observe in the Figure 7 a significant
increase of answers that allowed for interpretation when
the respondents were offered the alternative explanation
choices. The ‘Social sciences’ cohort were not helped and
the percentage of sensical responses is only 58.49%. To all
other respondents we allowed them to skip the ‘Self expla-
nation of choice’ question and required that they at least
chose one of the alternative explanations. The sensical
answers increased significantly to 70.50% and 84.31% for
the ‘Arts & Culture’ and the ‘Natural sciences’ cohorts,
respectively. It is particularly noteworthy the increased
level of interpretability that this choice in the design of
our studies brought. We have counted 22 answers given
by the participants in the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort that
were not understandable only by themselves, but could
nevertheless be coded because of their choice of alterna-
tive explanation. This would have otherwise tilted the
percentage to only 54% sensical answers. We also had 10
that chose to skip the self-explanation and only select one
of the alternatives. 8
41,51 %
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15,69 %
58,49 %
70,50 %
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Figure 7: The nonsensical answers are decreasing after improvements
done to the survey after the first full-scale study.
7.1.2. Programming Environment Confinement
The second observation regards the confinement as-
pect that we described in Section 6.1. One can observe
that as soon as the participants were confined their ex-
planations became even more sensical. Here we look at
the two cohorts that were helped (i.e., to whom alter-
native explanations were offered), and we notice the in-
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Figure 8: Distribution of respondents in age groups, grouped by cohort.
crease from 70.50% to 84.31% in the case of the respon-
dents from the ‘Natural sciences’ cohort who were confined
to the classroom and course working-hours. This bears
evidence that the transition from a non-professional to-
wards a more professional programming environment (as
explained in Section 6.1, where people are both ‘forced’ to
focus appropriately on their task as well as being helped
by resources or tools) would trigger the programmers to
be more careful about their choices. This could also con-
tribute to lowering the amount of bias. Indeed, we have
observed that several participants tried to think in terms
of games, since the task consisted of programming a game.
Examples of such explanations are: “I choose left because
it’s a game and i think according to the pattern gamer will
choose right side psychologically. Thus he/she will lose.”
(pID M:11274822275, third cohort); or “I feel the right
side would be the most common choice so if the player was
thinking creatively they would choose the left side to place
the h” (pID M:11274883590, third cohort).
Another aspect of the confinement is that it triggers the
System 2 thinking, which is known to result in a reduction
of human biases. We have also observed instances of Sys-
tem 1 vs. System 2 thinking in our participants, i.e., ‘start-
ing’ as a System 1 response, but then ‘self-apprehended’
and activated a System 2 response. One example is a par-
ticipant who has chosen to answer the letter placement
question with ‘Right’ but then when asked to explain the
choice said “I choosed right previously but actually left
makes more sense. Balancing the sides; 4 letters on the
left, 4 letters on the right.” (pID M:11272410463, third
cohort). Another explanation applies this reasoning to
the ‘players’, thus also thinking in terms of the game task
at hand: “The reason why I would give the reward if the
player place on the left is because of both dotted boxes are
the correct answer. However, I feel that most would place
it to the right since it is easier to recognize that H comes
after G. So figured that would place it there without know-
ing they could be gotten the same correct. So I concluded
that the reason why I choose the left is that fewer people
would pick that.” (pID M:11272095027, third cohort).
7.1.3. Suggestions
Such observations should be further investigated using
more controlled experiments. In any case, one piece of
conclusive advice that we can offer is that it is useful for
the outcome of the experiment if the respondents are given
(i.e., as help) alternative choices of answers/explanations
(or rationales in our case). These choices should be care-
fully made, preferably using answers that are observable
in the target population (i.e., like we did ourselves, ex-
tracting answers from the first survey). A more controlled
experiment should yield more sensical answers, e.g., by
carrying out the experiment in a more strict ‘laboratory’
setting. It seems that only paying the participants, as we
did through the two platforms SurveyMonkey and Ama-
zon’s mTurk, does not increase the quality of the answers.
7.2. Demographics
We categorized the respondents into four age-groups,
which we also named: (i) 18-25 – ‘younger students’, (ii)
25-30 – ‘older students’, (iii) 30-59 – ‘professionals’ work-
ing in their respective fields, and (iv) older than 59 – ‘ap-
proximation of the retirement age’. Relevant for our anal-
ysis was to look at which age group is representative for
each cohort. As shown in the Figure 8 for ‘Social sciences’
and ‘Natural sciences’ cohorts, these are predominantly
composed of respondents between the age of 18 and 25. 9
In the case of the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort, the respon-
dents, though they have the same educational/professional
background, differ in location: (i) the group with respon-
dents from mTurk are located in different countries, (ii)
the group with respondents from SurveyMonkey are lo-
cated in Sweden, while (iii) the group from ‘Cultural stud-
ies’ are located in Norway. In addition, the mTurk and
SurveyMonkey respondents were recruited based on their
professional affiliation, while the ‘Cultural studies’ respon-
dents were recruited based on study line affiliation. From
the chart in Figure 8, we can see that for the mTurk and
SurveyMonkey respondents the predominant age group is
30-59, while for the ‘Cultural studies’ respondents is 18-25.
Based on these age groupings we can conclude that
for the ‘Social sciences’, ‘Natural sciences’ and ‘Cultural
studies’ cohorts the respondents are predominantly ‘young
students’, of age between 18-25, while for the mTurk and
SurveyMonkey, the respondents are predominantly ‘pro-
fessionals’, of age between 30-59.
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(b) Distributed by the three rationales (into which the respondents’
answers to the ‘Self explanation of choice’ question were categorized).
Figure 9: Overview of the choice of placement of the letter ‘H’ to the Left or Light.
8. Control Questions
In the study we included several additional questions
with the purpose to control for various aspects. As one can
recall from Section 6.4, we have used the open-ended ques-
tions to identify robot/automated answers. Three ques-
tions were of particular importance, as they were meant to
control, or to reinforce, three important assumptions that
we have. These control questions are analysed in detail in
the next subsections. Essentially, Section 8.1 reinforces our
bias revealing test from Section 3 as a good instrument;
Section 8.2 tests how well our priming metaphors from
Section 4 worked, since such story-based metaphors may
be revealed within listings of words/synonyms; whereas
Section 8.3 reinforces our beliefs and categorization of the
backgrounds of the three cohorts that we study, thus con-
firming that the categories/labels we provided in Section 6.1
are appropriate, and the bias transfer studies that we con-
duct, as described in Section 9.1, are well informed.
8.1. Left/Right Placement
On the ‘Programming task’ page of the survey, the re-
spondents are asked to decide whether to reward the player
for the placement of the letter ‘H’ on the left or right side
of the vertical line on the game board. This is one of the
three questions on this page, intended as a control ques-
tion for the hypothesis that we made in Section 3, i.e., that
choosing to place the letter to the ‘right’ should indicate
a preference for the ‘algorithm’ rationale, while choosing
‘left’ a preference for the ‘balance’ or ‘shapes’ rationales.
An analysis of the ‘left/right’ placement wrt. each of
the three rationales confirms this initial assumption, see
Figure 9b for numbers. In particular, observe that in the
case of the ‘algorithm’ rationale the choice of placement
to the ‘right’ is overwhelming for each cohort; and simi-
larly, ‘left’ is the preferred choice when answering with the
‘balance’ or ‘shapes’ rationales in all cohorts.
Moreover, the analysis of the ‘left/right’ placement over-
all inside each cohort, which we summarize in Figure 9a,
confirms our earlier observation that the background of the
participants is reflected in their preference for one choice
of placement (and thus for one type of rationale). The ‘So-
cial sciences’ cohort chose mostly ‘left’, associated with the
‘balance’ and ‘shapes’ rationale, in a proportion of 74.19%.
The ‘Natural sciences’ cohort chose mostly ‘right’, asso-
ciated with the ‘algorithm’ rationale, in a proportion of
53.49%. The ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort again chose mostly
‘left’ in a proportion of 54.08%. 1
Though there are more pattern combinations possible
when the letter ‘H’ is placed on the right, there is also
one pattern combination possible with the placement of
the letter ‘H’ on the left. This is the sequence of 1-3-
2 letters, reversed from right to left. For the ‘Natural
sciences’ cohort we observe that eight participants out of
20 that chose ‘left’ (9 associated with ‘balance’ and 3 with
‘shapes’) chose this type of pattern combination. This can
explain the percentage of respondents in this cohort that
chose the ‘left’ side.
There are responses identifying this type of pattern also
in the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort. In addition, the respon-
dents here were even more creative, by finding additional
pattern combinations with the placement of the letter ‘H’
on the left, e.g.: the initial 1-3-2-1 pattern of letters will
continue with ‘H’ as the first letter in a similar pattern of
1-3-2-1 or a pattern of the type 1-3-2-1-2-3.
8.2. Words Suggestions vs. Priming Metaphor
In this section we analyse the words given by the re-
spondents to the ‘Words suggestions’ question of the sur-
vey, which was meant as a control question for our priming
metaphors, i.e., to reveal which of the primes worked and
how well. This is relevant for our second research question:
the transfer of contextual bias, which we analyse closer in
Section 9.2. In particular, this control question was in-
tended to check the suitability of the priming words that
we have chosen. Moreover, in the future, one can extract
from these suggested words more adequate priming words,
for further research on alternative priming metaphors.
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6 balanse 6 kreativitet 11 orden 11 rettferdighet 9 utseende 6 logikk 54 peace 53 beauty 12 law
[balance] [creativity] [order] [fairness] [looks] [logic]
5 fred 4 kultur 6 regler 9 balanse 7 skjønnhet 6 orden 26 balance 24 creativity 11 organized
[peace] [culture] [rules] [balance] [beauty] [order]
4 likestilling 4 kunst 3 organisert 5 fred 5 kreativitet 5 forutsigbarhet 17 fairness 10 expression 11 structure
[equality] [art] [organized] [peace] [creativity] [predictability]
3 rettferdighet 4 vakkert 3 system 4 symmetri 4 vakkert 3 konsekvens 8 love 8 pleasing 10 stability
[fairness] [beautiful] [system] [symmetry] [beautiful] [consequence]
3 samhold 2 skjønnhet 2 fortsetter 3 samarbeid 2 design 3 organisert 7 tranquility 5 craft 8 consistency
[solidarity] [beauty] [continues] [cooperation] [design] [organised]
*NOTE: The "forms" word appears only twice, being ranked lower in the list.
230 228 217
79 87 112
Nr. Words w/ Duplicates
73 69 72 59 57 60
Aspect 1 Aspect 2* Aspect 3
Nr. Unique Words
50 50 47 29 32 34
Aspect 1 Aspect 2 Aspect 3 Aspect 1 Aspect 2 Aspect 3
Social Sciences Cohort − 
With Responses in Norwegian
Nr. Respondents Natural Sciences Cohort − 
With Responses in Norwegian
Nr. Respondents
Arts and Culture Cohort − 
With Responses in English Language Only 
(mTurk and SurveyMonkey)
Nr. Respondents
38 41 116
Table 1: First five most suggested words, with the number of occurrences to the left of each word.
The words were cleaned up for spelling and uppercases.
In addition, we changed the derived words to only one
syntactic form, i.e., adjective, verb, noun, or adverb. The
precise syntactic form that was kept was decided based on
the frequency of that form throughout all the responses.
In the very few places where sentences were used instead of
words, we kept only relevant individual or composed words
(e.g., from “pleasant surroundings” we kept only the word
“pleasant”; or from “being crafty” only “crafty”; or “ap-
preciating beauty” was split in two words “appreciation” –
changed into a noun, as this was the form most used in
the responses – and “beauty”), and removed other syntac-
tic forms, such as conjunctions, prepositions, and pronouns
that did not have a meaning by themselves or their mean-
ing was not relevant for explaining the respective ‘life-
aspect’. We also created compounded words where this
was possible (e.g., “looking good” was changed into “good-
looking”). We strived to be minimal in such changes, and
we especially did not do semantic changes.
The participants were given three pairs of words to sug-
gest synonyms for, each containing two of the four prim-
ing words used in the ‘Philosopher story’, i.e.: “Could you
suggest 1 to 4 individual words that for you have similar
meanings as each of the three life-aspects: ‘harmony and
equality’; ‘balance and fairness’; ‘order and continuity’ ”.
In analysing the responses for the ‘Words suggestions’
question, we looked for the occurrence of the other two
words that were used in the ‘Philosopher story’ as primes
(cf. Section 4 also), i.e.: 2
• For the case when the respondents were given ‘har-
mony and equality’ (which we will call ‘Aspect 1’ in
the rest of the section) as words to find synonyms
for, we looked for the occurrence of ‘balance’ and
‘fairness’ in their answers.
• For ‘aesthetics and arts’ (‘Aspect 2’ ) we counted oc-
currences of ‘beauty’ and ‘forms’;
• For ‘order and continuity’ (‘Aspect 3’ ) we counted
‘structure’ and ‘linearity’.
Since we had Norwegian speaking respondents we pre-
pared a Norwegian version of the ‘Philosopher story’ with
the corresponding words beeing respectively: ‘harmoni’,
‘likhet’, ‘balanse’, ‘rettferdighet’; and ‘estetikk’, ‘kunst-
former’, ‘skjønnhet’; and ‘struktur’, ‘kontinuitet’, ‘gjenta-
kelse’, ‘linearitet’ (see translations in Table 2). In this
case, the given words for the ‘Aspect 2’ were actually
three of the four priming words because we gave the com-
pound word ‘kunstformer’ which contains in translation
both ‘forms’ and ‘arts’. As such, only one word of the
four, i.e., ‘beauty’, remained to be counted. However, the
responses contain one word that is very similar in meaning
with ‘beauty’, namely ‘vakkert’ (beautiful). The degree
of similarity was evaluated using the “meaning relation”
of the Norwegian WordNet14 which gives the extremely
close numbers 0.155 for ‘skjønnhet’ (beauty) and 0.153 for
‘vakkert’ (beautiful).
An overview of the first five most ‘suggested words’
for each cohort is given in Table 1: “The First Five Most
‘Suggested Words’ ”. The expected words for the ‘Aspect
1’ appear among the five most occurring words, sometimes
at the top, in all three cohorts. For the ‘Aspect 2’, the
word ‘beauty’ appears highly ranked, but not the word
‘forms’; again this is the case for all three cohorts. How-
ever, for ‘Aspect 3’ we only see the word ‘structure’ ap-
pearing among the top five only in the ‘Arts and Culture’
cohort, which had the English version. None of the two
corresponding Norwegian words appear in the responses of
the ‘Social sciences’ and ‘Natural sciences’ cohorts. The
word ‘linearity’ did not appear at all.
We have used the Norwegian WordNet (most recent
year count being 2013) frequency feature to check how
14National Library of Norway. 2015. Raw data: N-gram (NBdig-
ital). Date: 2015-06-02. http://www.nb.no/sprakbanken/show?
serial=sbr-35&lang=nb
23
Group Nr. Resp.
Balanse 
[Balance]
Rettferdighet 
[Fairness]
Balanse 
% Nr. 
Rettferdighet 
% Nr.
B + R 
% Nr. 
Skjønnhet 
[Beauty]
Vakkert
[Beautiful]
Skjønnhet 
% Nr. 
Vakkert
% Nr.
S + V
% Nr.
Harmoni og Likhet
[Harmony and Equality] 9 2 1 22,22 % 11,11 % 33,33 % 1 0 11,11 % 0,00 % 11,11 %
Estetikk og Kunstformer
[Aesthetics and Arts] 6 0 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0 3 0,00 % 50,00 % 50,00 %
Struktur og Kontinuitet
[Order and Continuity] 14 4 1 28,57 % 7,14 % 35,71 % 1 0 7,14 % 0,00 % 7,14 %
Control 9 0 1 0,00 % 11,11 % 11,11 % 0 1 0,00 % 11,11 % 11,11 %
Total 38 6 3 15,79 % 7,89 % 23,68 % 2 4 5,26 % 10,53 % 15,79 %
ASPECT 1: Harmoni & Likhet [Harmony & Equality] ASPECT 2:  Estetikk & Kunstformer [Aesthetics & Arts]
(a) Occurrence of priming words in ‘Social sciences’ cohort.
Group Nr. Resp.
Balanse 
[Balance]
Rettferdighet 
[Fairness]
Balanse 
%  Nr.
Rettferdighet 
% Nr.
B + R 
% Nr.
Skjønnhet 
[Beauty]
Vakkert
[Beautiful]
Skjønnhet 
% Nr. 
Vakkert
% Nr.
S + V
% Nr.
Harmoni og Likhet
[Harmony and Equality] 15 5 6 33,33 % 40,00 % 73,33 % 3 2 20,00 % 13,33 % 33,33 %
Estetikk og Kunstformer
[Aesthetics and Arts] 9 2 2 22,22 % 22,22 % 44,44 % 2 1 22,22 % 11,11 % 33,33 %
Struktur og Kontinuitet
[Order and Continuity] 5 1 0 20,00 % 0,00 % 20,00 % 0 0 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 %
Control 12 1 3 8,33 % 25,00 % 33,33 % 2 1 16,67 % 8,33 % 25,00 %
Total 41 9 11 21,95 % 26,83 % 48,78 % 7 4 17,07 % 9,76 % 26,83 %
ASPECT 1: Harmoni & Likhet [Harmony & Equality] ASPECT 2:  Estetikk & Kunstformer [Aesthetics & Arts]
(b) Occurrence of priming words in ‘Natural sciences’ cohort.
Group Nr. Resp. Balance Fairness
Balance 
%  Nr.
Fairness
 % Nr.
B + F 
% Nr. Beauty  Beauty % Nr. Structure  Structure % Nr.
Harmony and Equality 30 11 7 36,67 % 23,33 % 60,00 % 15 50,00 % 2 6,67 %
Aesthetics and Arts 32 3 2 9,38 % 6,25 % 15,63 % 13 40,63 % 1 3,13 %
Order and Continuity 28 7 2 25,00 % 7,14 % 32,14 % 10 35,71 % 6 21,43 %
Control 26 5 6 19,23 % 23,08 % 42,31 % 15 57,69 % 2 7,69 %
Total 116 26 17 22,41 % 14,66 % 37,07 % 53 45,69 % 11 9,48 %
ASPECT 1: Harmony & Equality ASPECT 2:  Aesthetics & Arts ASPECT 3: Order & Continuity
(c) Occurrence of priming words in ‘Arts and Crafts’ cohort.
Table 2: Occurrence of priming words.
frequent are the two words of the ‘Aspect 3’ in the Norwe-
gian vocabulary. It turns out that these two words have
a very low frequency: 0.0001857 for ‘gjentakelse’ (equiva-
lent to ‘structure’) and 0.0000097 for ‘linearitet’ (equiva-
lent to ‘linearity’). Compare these frequencies with those
for the other words: 0.001938 for ‘balanse’, 0.001121 for
‘rettferdignet’, which are one order of magnitude higher,
or 0.002912 for ‘vakkert’ or 0.001410 for ‘skjønn’ (short
version of ‘skjønnhet’ which we used).
We conclude that the use of the word ‘structure’ was
successful, and can continue to be used in further research.
However, another more widely known word needs to be
used as Norwegian equivalent. This concerns the ‘linear-
ity’ word as well, for both Norwegian and English. We
were not aware of the existence of WordNet at the time
when we prepared our metaphors (in 2018-2019); but such
tools can be valuable for choosing priming words. In our
case we were not only interested in synonyms, but more in
words that could prime towards the three different ratio-
nales for our programming test; e.g., the word ‘forms’ was
important, as well as ‘linearity’.
Table 2 gives an overview of the numbers of occur-
rences (frequencies and percentages) of the priming words
for each of the cohorts. The percentage numbers are calcu-
lated wrt. the number of respondents. In order to evaluate
the priming effect of our metaphors we can compare the
percentages from the primed group with the ones from the
control group. The priming group considered is the one
relevant for the respective aspect (highlighted in our ta-
bles), i.e., for the ‘Aspect 1’ we look at the numbers of the
‘Harmony and Equality’ group.
For the ‘Social Sciences’ cohort we see the effect of
priming on both ‘Aspect 1’ and ‘Aspect 2’: 33.33% (rep-
resenting the total from both ‘priming’ words) to 11.11%
and respectively 50% to 11.11%. The ‘priming’ words for
the ‘Aspect 3’ did not occur at all, thus, do not appear
in the table. The table for the ‘Natural Sciences’ cohort
shows again the influence of priming in the case of ‘Aspect
1’ and ‘Aspect 2’: 73.33% to 33.33%, and 33.33% to 25%.
For the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort we observe the effect of
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priming in the case of ‘Aspect 1’ and ‘Aspect 2’: 60% to
42.31%, and 21.43% to 7.69%. For the ‘Aspect 3’, only one
of the two words occurred, hence only one was considered.
However, for the ‘Aspect 2’ we do not see a priming
effect, when compared with the control group. Quite the
opposite, we can observe that the word ‘beauty’ appears
many times, with a total number of 53 occurrences and
its distribution between the groups relatively even: 50%,
40.63%, 35.71%, and 57.69%. The word ‘beauty’ seems
to be present by default in the vocabulary of this cohort,
irrespective of priming. This observation confirms that we
did well by choosing a word that is largely used by this
population.
This indicates two other factors that might have had
influence on the priming effect. One of these factors is how
familiar the respondents are with the priming words. If the
words are very little known or not understood, they will
not be primed by them, as it is the case of the ‘Aspect 3’
words. In addition, if the respondents have a large vocab-
ulary to their disposal, which can be seen from comparing
the ‘Nr. of unique words’ with the ‘Nr. of words with du-
plicates’ (see Table 1), the System 1 will be less inclined
to use the priming words. Such observations can be made
in the case of the ‘Social sciences’ students in comparison
with the ‘Natural sciences’ students: 147 unique words
compared to 95. We see how the priming was stronger in
the latter cohort compared to the former (they strive to
find similar words, and the availability heuristic retrieves
the primes from the short term memory).
The words the participants choose the most can also be
affected by other immediate contextual elements. In the
case of the ‘Natural sciences’ cohort the survey was taken
by the students as part of a course on logic. This made
the word ‘logic’ occur the most for ‘Aspect 3’.
8.3. Life-aspects Ranking
The ‘Ranking life-aspects’ was meant as a control ques-
tion for the way we identify the background in our cohorts.
That is to say, we want to check whether there is a correla-
tion between the self-ranking of the ‘life-aspects’ and what
we have considered as the background of the respondents.
Moreover, we want to also look at the coded answers from
the ‘Self explanation of choice’ compared to the ‘Ranking
life-aspects’ because if the correlation is similar to the one
we have observed previously from the background, then
this would reinforce our perception of background.
For creating the three types of cohorts we have consid-
ered the educational and professional backgrounds. How-
ever, these are only one part of a person’s background,
arguably a large part, but yet a larger part is made of the
society and culture that the respondents belong to. This
is especially so for younger people, such as students. For
the ‘Ranking life-aspects’ we observe influences that come
from the socio-cultural as well as educational and profes-
sional backgrounds. How strong these are, and how much
they relate to the bias transfer that we have observed be-
fore, is what we investigate in this section.
Socio-cultural Influences
Educational
Professional AG
E
'Natural Sciences' Cohort
'Social Sciences' Cohort
'Cultural Studies' Group 
('Arts and Culture' Cohort)
mTurk and SurveyMonkey Respondents
('Arts and Culture' Cohort)
Young Students
Older Students
Working Professionals
Close to Retirement
Figure 10: Three sources of influence, correlated with the age when
they are most strong, for the backgrounds observed for our cohorts,
also indicating the age groups observed in the Section 7.2.
We summarize the three types of influences in the Fig-
ure 10, organized as a pyramid as we explain further.
Remember that the names that we gave to the ‘life-
aspects’ to be ranked by the participants were each us-
ing two of the four words used in Section 4 as priming
metaphors, i.e.: ‘harmony and equality’, ‘aesthetics and
arts’, and ‘order and continuity’. One word from the start
of the story and another from the end of the story.
One’s view on life is, among others, highly influenced
by society and culture Cialdini & Goldstein (2004); Schultz
et al. (2007); Cialdini (2009). For children this may be
the main influence (e.g., through their parents), whereas
for young adults (like many of our respondents who are
young students) other factors of their own life-experience
start to influence their views, including their education
when they are studying and their professional environment
when they start working. As presented in the Section 7.2,
our respondents can be grouped in two main socio-cultural
categories based on their location, i.e., one ‘mixed location’
(because the participants have a ‘mixed’ provenance) and
one ‘Scandinavian’ (because of the respondents being lo-
cated in Norway and Sweden). Since in this section we are
particularly concerned with the socio-cultural background,
and since the Arts and Culture cohort is composed of both
respondents with ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘mixed’ provenance,
we have decided to regard this cohort as two groups. 12
In the chart from Figure 11 we have counted the num-
ber of respondents that chose to rank first each of the
three life-aspects, and we have plotted the respective per-
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Figure 11: First ranked life-aspect in each cohort.
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Figure 12: Second ranked life-aspect distributed by first ranked and grouped by cohort.
centages of the total inside the respective group. It is note-
worthy to observe that in the case of the ‘Social sciences’
and ‘Natural sciences’ cohort, as well as the ‘Scandina-
vian’ group from the Arts and Culture cohort, most first
ranked is ‘harmony and equality’, followed by ‘aesthetics
and arts’, and ‘order and continuity’ is only last. How-
ever, in the case of the ‘mixed location’ group from the
Arts and Culture cohort most first ranked is ‘aesthetics
and art’ whereas ‘harmony and equality’ is slightly less
chosen as first ranked.
Our interpretations are based on the fact that we are
knowledgeable when it comes to what characterizes the
‘Scandinavian’ type of culture and society, while having
no knowledge about the ‘mixed location’ group. However,
our observations for the ‘mixed location’ group are based
on their professional background (as opposed to the edu-
cational background, in the case of the students’ cohorts).
The fact that ‘Scandinavian’ respondents across all co-
horts value highest ‘harmony and equality’ can be mo-
tivated by socio-cultural influences. These respondents
come from a culture that promotes social equality, with
high taxes for social-welfare and strong disregard for social
unrest. In the case of the ‘mixed location’ respondents, the
view on life seems to be influenced strongest by their pro-
fessional background, maybe also because these are “work-
ing age” respondents (as shown in the Section 7.2).
We also counted the choices of second ranked life-aspect
(see Figure 12), looking inside each of the columns from the
graph above. For the ‘Social sciences’ cohort the second
ranking was ‘order and continuity’, being on the first rank
in both columns with ‘harmony and equality’ and ‘aesthet-
ics and arts’. Note that ‘harmony and equality’ can be seen
both influenced by education and the socio-cultural back-
ground. However, in the column with ‘order and continu-
ity’ the most second ranked is the ‘harmony and equal-
ity’ which corresponds with the educational background
of the respondents. Thus we tend to conclude that the
background of this cohort corresponds to the life-aspect
‘harmony and equality’ where both the socio-cultural and
educational backgrounds contribute.
In the case of the ‘Natural sciences’ cohort, the second
ranked was ‘order and continuity’, which is in accordance
with the educational background.
When it comes to the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort, the
second ranked for the ‘Scandinavian’ group is ‘aesthetics
and arts’, in both columns that do not correspond to their
education i.e., ‘harmony and equality’ and ‘order and con-
tinuity’. This again tells that the educational background
influences these respondents, albeit less than their socio-
cultural background.
For the ‘mixed location’ group ‘order and continuity’
was ranked as second most in the ‘harmony and equality’
column, while ‘harmony and equality’ was ranked second
most in the ‘aesthetics and arts’ column. In this case we
tend to conclude that the ‘professional’ background influ-
ences the view on life of these respondents the most.
In conclusion, we think that the control question about
‘Ranking life-aspects’ confirms our assumptions about the
backgrounds for our three cohorts and the fact that we
have associated each of these cohorts with the life-aspect
that is most predominant for those respondents. There-
fore, we consider adequate the claims that we make through-
out the paper where we correlate the background of a co-
hort with one specific life-aspect, and thus with one specific
corresponding bias/rationale.
9. Results
The data is analysed both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. The qualitative analysis is done usually to detail the
quantitative data, by analysing the participants’ responses
to the open-ended questions. 13
Our study is exploratory and tentative, this is why we
employ a combination of statistical and descriptive anal-
ysis. Statistical analyses were not possible in all situa-
tions because of the small number of respondents in those
categories. Statistical analyses were possible when the re-
sults from all cohorts were put together (analysis across
the three cohorts) or in the case of the ‘Arts and Culture’
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Figure 13: Comparison of background influences.
cohort where we had 139 responses. Results from the de-
scriptive analysis capture several systematic tendencies of
the responses, which we detail below.
9.1. Influences from the Cultural Background
Students with a cultural background from social sci-
ences differed significantly from students with a cultural
background from computer science. ‘Social sciences’ stu-
dents were significantly more prone than computer science
students to describe their choices matching the rationale
‘balance’ from Section 3.I, whereas computer science stu-
dents were significantly more prone than ‘Social sciences’
students to describe their choices matching the rationale
‘algorithm’ from Section 3.III: X2(1, N = 71) = 8.1686,
p < .05 (with calculated p-value of .004262). The results
support the hypothesis that the cultural background in-
fluences people when they carry out programming tasks
under conditions of uncertainty.
The statistical significance test, as well as the graph
in the Figure 13a consider the total number of responses,
from all four treatments. The same observations about
the cultural background influence are confirmed also when
looking only at the control group (see the graph in the
Figure 13b), though a statistical test is not relevant in
this case, given the small number of responses. For both
graphs the percentages are calculated from the ‘sensical’
answers only.
When analysing the results from the ‘Arts and Cul-
ture’ cohort in comparison with the other two cohorts (see
Figure 14), we see that the influence of their artistic back-
ground makes them choose much more the ‘shapes’ ratio-
nale from Section 3.II; i.e., 16% compared to 7% in the
‘Natural sciences’ cohort and 0% in the ‘Social sciences’
cohort.
Analysing further this cohort by itself, independently
of the results obtained for the other cohorts, we see in
the Figure 15 that the answers conforming to the ‘algo-
rithm’ rationale are dominant; both when looking at all
responses as well as only at the control group. This domi-
nance could be explained by the fact that the respondents
tried to comply with the nature and requirements of the
exercise, i.e., a programming task where they were asked
to assume the role of a programmer. One example of an
answer from this cohort confirms this affirmation: “It was
always drilled into my head in school, that when it came
to math (which I assume is what most programming deals
with) that the right side is always the right way. . . ‘right
side right way’ that’s my reasoning here.” The respon-
dent tries in this case to bring in to his/her help the math
knowledge s/he has from the school, as s/he assumes that
informatics “deals with” mathematics. Another example
is “I can’t think of a better explanation but to involve math-
ematics in this game. . . ”.
Moreover, when analysing qualitatively the answers to
the ‘Self explanation of choice’ question we found a con-
siderable number of respondents that brought the game
aspect of the task into their reasoning (more than 30 out
of 110 explanations of the ‘Arts and Culture’ cohort), i.e.,
they think in terms of programming a game. This is also
an indication that these respondents focused on the task
at hand, seeing the puzzle as part of this game program-
ming task – as they have been asked to – and did not
try to solve the puzzle per se. This increases our confi-
dence in the fact that there was no debiasing happening,
and that the respondents did not recognize that the task
was in fact meant to reveal a background bias, let alone
one of our three rationales or cohort backgrounds that we
have assumed. Another aspect that could trigger debi-
asing is the fact that our puzzle does not have a ‘correct’
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answer wrt. the letter placement. However, we have found
only two responses that have identified this fact (“[...]be-
cause of both dotted boxes are the correct answer. How-
ever, I feel[...]” from pID M:11270469031, third cohort,
and “[...]there isn’t enough information for me to decide,
so it is kind of a guess.” from pID M:11270119183, third
cohort); therefore, we rule out this debiasing possibility as
well.
9.2. Influences from the Priming Metaphors
The qualitative analysis of the respondents’ answers
to the ‘Self explanation of choice’ shows three instances
where the priming metaphors influence the answers of the
participants. Here are three examples from the ‘Arts and
Culture’ cohort that show how the respondents quote di-
rectly the primes from the ‘Philosopher story’ to help in
arguing their reasoning behind the choice of letter place-
ment. All three answers fall into the rational category
related to the prime; and all invoke only some of the four
words that we used for priming. Moreover, these words are
taken both from the start and end of the story, which con-
firms our decision of using several words placed at different
points inside the ‘Philosopher story’.
• pID M:11271203853, third cohort: “If this game is
based on the philosopher’s tenet of balance and har-
mony, then[...]”15
• pID M:11270378880, third cohort: “The player should
be rewarded when he/she places the letter on the
right side because that is in keeping with the conti-
nuity and linear structure of the game.”16
• pID 103, second cohort: “The philosopher thought
balance and equality were important, and the player
15The words are found at the start of the story.
16There are actually three of the priming words mentioned here:
“linearity and continuity” (from the end of the story) and “structure”
from the start of the story. However, the respondent puts together
“linear structure”.
should therefore be rewarded for restoring the bal-
ance between the number of letters on the right and
left sides.”17
Since these examples are very few, they do not warrant
a conclusion of conscious transfer of priming bias, which is
exactly the point with priming techniques, i.e., that peo-
ple who are influenced through priming generally do not
realize it, and thus one does not normally see the priming
expressed per se in the respondents arguments. Instead,
the respondents being primed would make use of one or
more of the heuristics that we mentioned in Sections 2
and 4, e.g., the availability heuristic is most often used
when people make quick judgements; we have encountered
one respondent in which this heuristic has obviously mani-
fested, pID M:11272410463, third cohort: “I choosed right
previously but actually left makes more sense. Balancing
the sides; 4 letters on the left, 4 letters on the right.”.
Heuristics are also used substantially in situations of
uncertainty, which is the case for our puzzle since we ask
participants to find one ‘solution’ to this new puzzle, which
at the same time does not have one single correct answer,
as any argument would be acceptable. In cases of un-
certainty two additional heuristics are usually employed,
namely the representativeness heuristic and the anchoring
heuristic. If the problem at hand is new, then the mind
tries to find another previously encountered problem that,
to some extent, has some similarities. This is the case with
the puzzle that we devised, aiming to trigger associations
with aspects from the cultural/educational background of
the person, e.g., ‘Natural sciences’ respondents were ex-
pected to cling on to algorithms and the alphabet as an
ordered source of indexing in mathematics, thus continu-
ing along the line in our puzzle. The anchoring heuristic
is even more important for priming since it is often em-
ployed when no useful information is readily available for
the problem at hand, so the mind looks into the immedi-
ate context (e.g., physical, s.a., surroundings, or tempo-
ral, s.a., information received in the recent past, from the
short-term memory) for clues. In our case the mind would
anchor into the ‘Philosopher story’ metaphor, and maybe
draw on the meaning of one of the four priming words.
In analyzing the explanations/responses we observed
to some extent influences of our experimental manipula-
tions, albeit not reaching statistical significance. Thus,
since we can neither rule out a Type I error (i.e., failing to
reject the research hypothesis, i.e., no priming effect) nor
a Type II error (failing to reject the null hypothesis, i.e.,
there exists an effect, but we were not able to elicit it), the
influence of contextual metaphors need to be further re-
searched. In the rest of this section we present results from
quantitative analyses of the priming effect and whether or
not this transferred to the programs, i.e., found in the an-
swers to the ‘Self explanation of choice’ and ‘Alternative
explanations’ questions.
17One word from the start of the story and one from the end.
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Figure 16: Effect of priming, irrespective of background – respon-
dents from all cohorts put together.
The graph in the Figure 16 shows the influence of the
three groups of priming metaphors when the responses
from all the cohorts are put together. This shows the prim-
ing effect irrespective of the participants’ background. We
compare each group with the control group.
First of all, we observe that the ‘algorithm’ group gives
answers that cannot be readily seen as being influenced
by priming. The same inconclusive observation is found
also when looking inside each cohort, comparing the ‘al-
gorithm’ group there with the respective control group.
However, this is conforming with the observations made
in Section 8.2, where the words used for priming are little
known or maybe not understood by the participants, and
thus cannot have an impact on their choice. However, one
needs to take this conclusion with a grain of salt because
the priming metaphor, depending on the anchoring heuris-
tic, has a temporal flavour as it is stronger closer to the
time of the priming; i.e., in our case the ‘Self explanation
of choice’ question is very close to the priming metaphor,
whereas the ‘Words suggestions’ question is farther away,
maybe with a delay of a few minutes. This can mean that
even if we do not see an effect of the metaphor in the
‘Words suggestions’ question one can still have some ef-
fect in the ‘Self explanation of choice’ question. Moreover,
this can be compounded by other factors as well, such as
for the ‘Words suggestions’ question we are looking only
for two of the words whereas in the ‘Self explanation of
choice’ question all our four priming words are in effect;
or by the semantics of the words, which can have different
meanings in different context, thus possibly causing one
influence on the programming task and another influence
on the synonyms generation task. Therefore, we focus in
the rest of the section on the other two groups of priming.
Secondly, when we analyse the other two groups we
clearly observe priming influences, albeit of different kinds
as explained further. For the ‘balance’ group we see that
the ‘balance’ rationale increases from 28.26% (for the con-
trol group) to 43.18% (for the ‘balance’ group), whereas
in the case of the ‘shapes’ group the ‘shapes’ rationale
increase from 8.70% to 15.70%; irrespective of the back-
ground.
Besides these observations about the general strength
of the priming metaphors, we are to a greater extent inter-
ested in their interactions with the educational/profession-
al background of the participants, as discussed in the pre-
vious subsection. Since we already established that the
results related to the ‘algorithm’ metaphors are not reli-
able, we exclude them from our further investigation.
In the chart from the Figure 17a, related to the ‘So-
cial sciences’ cohort, we observe that the background of
the respondents is further strengthened by the priming
metaphors, with an increase from 58.33% to 100%. Quite
the opposite, in the case of the ‘Natural sciences’ cohort
(see Figure 17b), we see a weakening effect of their back-
ground since the ‘algorithms’ rationale decreases from 71.43%
to 58.85% in the group that was influenced with the ‘bal-
ance’ metaphor, in favor of the ‘balance’ rationale. For the
‘Arts and Culture’ cohort we again see (Figure 17c) that
the ‘shapes’ metaphor strengthens their background since
the ‘shapes’ rationale increases from 15% to 22.22% inside
the group that was primed with the ‘shapes’ metaphor.
For this cohort also the ‘balance’ metaphor has an in-
fluence (from 15% to 34.62%), due to the fact that this
metaphor’s words were well chosen, as we have observed
in Section 8.2.
We can conclude that the contextual metaphors that
have been deemed as strong enough in the control ques-
tion ‘Words suggestions’ are also found to have an effect in
strengthening or weakening the influence from metaphors
in the cultural background of the respondents. Contex-
tual metaphors have a strengthening effect when the words
100,00 %
58,33 %
0,00 %
41,67 %
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
G1:Balance
G4:ControlG
ro
u
p
Answer rationale: Balance Algorithm
(a) Social sciences cohort.
38,46 %
21,43 %
7,69 %
7,14 %
53,85 %
71,43 %
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
G1:Balance
G4:ControlG
ro
u
p
Answer rationale: Balance Shapes Algorithm
(b) Natural sciences cohort.
34,62 %
25,93 %
15,00 %
11,54 %
22,22 %
15,00 %
53,85 %
51,85 %
70,00 %
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
G1:Balance
G2:Shapes
G4:Control
G
ro
u
p
Answer rationale: Balance Shapes Algorithm
(c) Arts and Culture cohort.
Figure 17: Effect of priming, inside each cohort.
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are representative of the respective cultural background,
e.g., the ‘balance’ rationale is strengthened by the prim-
ing metaphor words ‘harmony and balance; equality and
fairness’, whereas the ‘shapes’ rationale by the ‘aesthetics
and beauty; forms of arts’ metaphor words. On the other
hand, when the contextual metaphor is well chosen, such
as for the ‘balance’ group, it weakens the effect from the
cultural background of the respondents, as is the case with
the ‘balance’ metaphor, which when applied in the ‘Natu-
ral sciences’ cohort, it increases the respective rationale.
10. Conclusions and Discussions
The aim of this study, as well as its implications, are
manifold. The study can be categorized as both (i) a com-
parative/experimental study of how biases from cultural
and contextual metaphors can be transferred from pro-
grammers to programs, and (ii) an exploratory study on
how to develop ergonomically valid and reliable instru-
ments, procedures and testing conditions to empirically
study such biases transfer. As such, this paper is a founda-
tion for future research endeavours to improve and diver-
sify these instruments, procedures and testing conditions.
The strengths of this work reside in its exploratory na-
ture in studying a hitherto not researched phenomenon,
namely the transfer of human biases from the (not nec-
essarily expert) programmer to the artefact that is devel-
oped (or configured). Concretely, we have exposed (in Sec-
tion 9) interesting aspects of our main hypothesis, namely
that machine bias may originate not only from biased data,
but also from the programmer’s biases in terms of influ-
ences from the cultural background as well as contextual
influences from the programming environment.
Interestingly, under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., in
the absence of instructions or specifications, something
which is often the case for ubiquitous systems program-
ming carried out increasingly by non-experts), we observe
that the programmers’ cultural background influences the
choices they make and are subsequently transferred from
the programmer to the program artifact. Thus, cultural
metaphors in terms of irrelevant and inappropriate influ-
ences on the programming task at hand, represent in-
stances of biases that are being transferred from humans
to machines. This implies that human culture ‘transfers’
to machines through the humans that program these, thus
representing a strong source of bias.
Equally interesting, attempts to moderate the strong
influence from the cultural metaphors by means of exper-
imentally introducing ‘hidden’ (i.e., not consciously de-
tected) contextual metaphors, were only successful to a
certain extent. When the priming metaphor was chosen
well (as in the case of ‘philosopher story’ related to the
‘balance’ rationale; with words that were easy to under-
stand and rather common in a standard vocabulary) we
saw influences in both directions of strengthening the cul-
tural background as well as moderating it, each time tip-
ping the balance of answers in the direction of the metaphor.
These findings are orthogonal to what traditional and cur-
rent machine bias research suggests, i.e., that machine bias
originates from data, and thus our findings provide new in-
sights into the origins of bias in the wide spreading AI and
decision-support systems.
We believe that the present study shows how various
aspects regarding design, instruments, and procedures can
be successfully explored and controlled, and consequently
incorporated in future studies that could (i) extend the
present study by exploring related causes and mechanisms
that lead to the transfer of bias from programmers to pro-
grams, as well as (ii) improve the designs, instruments and
procedures in order to undertake this expanded endeavour.
10.1. Discussions and Limitations
One potential limitation of our study is the relatively
small numbers of explanations/responses that we obtained
in the experimental groups, despite the fact that we have
had quite a large number of participants, i.e., 242 com-
pletely sensical explanations/answers that we were able
to interpret and categorize, plus 55 more that were not
completely nonsensical, but nevertheless uninterpretable
and uncategorizable. This limitation is explained, how-
ever, by our intention to perform a manifold exploratory
study, investigating several related aspects and research
questions, as well as providing a transparent foundation
for further future improvements of design, instruments and
procedures. As a consequence we arrived at a limited num-
ber of sensical and interpretable explanations ‘inside’ each
of the respective cohorts. However, a major intention in
our study is to allow future researchers to take our study as
a point of departure and carry out more controlled studies
of some of the single aspects that we identified. In or-
der to achieve increased confidence in the results that we
have presented here, it would be valuable to perform our
survey with even more participants, maybe in the order
of 1300+ (estimating, according to the observations from
Section 7.1, with a 4-to-1 ratio of sensical vs. nonsensical
results). Such a number would allow for all our groups to
be populated with 30+ responses, something which would
allow for an even more valuable use of statistical signifi-
cance tests.
It proved difficult to achieve our number of 300 par-
ticipants for this type of study; however, if one would
want to restrict a similar study to only professionals, one
of the many online forums or communities for program-
mers could be a good place to recruit participants (e.g.,
on freelancer.com or stackoverflow.com).
One interesting speculative observation that we would
like to make out of our results regards a potential effect
resulting from the difference between (i) interpreting in-
formation based on its structure and thus as something
systemic that is ‘detached’ from having individual char-
acteristics, versus (ii) interpreting information based on
its content and thus as having individual characteristics.
For example, subject-programmers that chose the ratio-
nales of ‘balance’ or ‘algorithm’ may view information (as
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the one coming from the ‘game board’ puzzle picture that
we showed them) merely as representing structure and
may thus have disregarded the notion that data could also
have individual characteristics in addition to being part of
an overall structure. Contrary to this, respondents that
chose ‘shapes’ may in fact have acknowledged the notion
that data do have individual characteristics and are thus
not ‘only’ part of an overall structure ‘outside’ the data’s
individual characteristics. Interestingly, subjects in the
arts & culture cohort provided explanations in terms of
‘shapes’ substantially more often than subjects in the ‘So-
cial sciences’ cohort and the ‘Computer science’ cohort.
This could indicate that people with a cultural background
(judging from their education and/or profession) from arts
and culture are more prone than others to view data as rep-
resentation of individuals that have unique characteristics,
rather than viewing data only as being part of an overall
structure. In other words, people with a background in
arts and culture may possibly exhibit a more ‘human’ in-
terpretation of data, or at least they may be more prone
than people from other cultural backgrounds to acknowl-
edge data as ‘individual’ rather than ‘systemic’.
10.2. Possible Future Research Directions
Future studies are invited to investigate more deeply
any of the aspects that we have explored and tentatively
concluded from. One venue for future research would be to
refine our study design’s ability to elicit cultural or con-
textual influences in an even more fine-grained manner,
specifically by improving our instruments and procedures.
One possibility is to perform similar studies focused on
specific categories of subjects that can be seen as program-
mers, e.g., one playfull possibility could be to study chil-
dren as programmers – programming languages/environ-
ments specific for children abund, s.a. Google’s Blockly
Trower & Gray (2015); Weintrop & Wilensky (2017) or
MIT’s Scratch Resnick et al. (2009); Maloney et al. (2010);
Armoni et al. (2015). Studies on biases in adults are more
available Klaczynski et al. (1997); Klaczynski & Robinson
(2000); Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) whereas studies on
biases in children are less Baron et al. (1993); Klaczyn-
ski (1997). One could argue that this is because children
are not biased; others could claim that ethical considera-
tions make such studies of children too difficult to carry
out; yet others could argue that biases in children are dis-
tinctly different from biases in adults, given the differences
in mental representations from children and adults. How-
ever, we think that it is important to test the age aspect
in biases transferred to programs, given the ubiquity and
pervasiveness of IoT-programming in everyday life for all
age groups.
One useful refinement of our work could be to study
professional programmers in a professional environment,
both (i) classical programming environments, such as in
a programming company guided by software development
life cycle methods and tools, maybe focusing on current
emerging programming cultures like Scrum or DevOps;
and (ii) non-expert programming environments, such as
complex configurations, DSLs, graphical programming, or
curating of big data. It is possible to study different ques-
tions in this setting, for example:
• On what avenues biases arrive into the programming
environment? We have assumed that it is a result
of underspecified requirements; i.e., when some func-
tionality is left open and the programmer does not
have the resources to find more specific details. This
is a most common form of uncertainty in program-
ming; but there are others as well, and which of these
give way to biases is important to know so that one
can build debiasing techniques, maybe even incorpo-
rated in the tools of the programmers, like in IDEs
(integrated development environments).
• Are expert programmers, when under the scrutiny
of their tools and methods, like testing suites, still
transferring their biases into their programs? Is this
happening only when they are given choices, or also
in other situations (e.g., even when fully specified
requirements are given; or when working with big
data)?
• Are programmers immune to biases because of their
education or because of their work (e.g., because at
work their ‘mind-set’ is a “mathematical” one)?
One good source of alternative investigations can be
the study of specific biases in specific situations or social
activities where software is paramount. One example can
be biases related to privacy in the big data economy (some-
times called the ‘surveillance capitalism’ Zuboff (2019)),
e.g.: Are privacy related concepts or views from the cul-
tural background – which is specific to the programmer –
transferred to the software – which is used on an interna-
tional scale? One can imagine a programmer coming from
a cultural background that always promotes the slogan
“You have zero privacy; get over it!”, or another program-
mer from a background that “is entrenched by rules and
regulations about who/how any form of private electronic
data can be used”. Are such different cultural views trans-
ferred to the software built by these two different program-
mers? What is the global influence of such bias transfers?
In this setting, one could alternatively study biases com-
ing from the user of the software (not the programmer) to
see whether the user biases (call them ‘wishes’ or ‘needs’)
are transferred to the software through specifications elic-
itation, user stories, and other interaction design methods
Rogers et al. (2011); Lazar et al. (2017) that are now a
popular way of developing software systems.
We have studied two sources of biases, namely cultural
biases and priming metaphors, that we consider situated
at the two extremes on the vertical axis from Figure 1,
which indicates the strength of the bias, and also a tem-
poral aspect regarding the persistence of these biases (e.g.,
priming may not be as strong as the culture, and acts on
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a short time scale, usually minutes after the priming is
applied). One could study other sources of influence that
can generate biases through the metaphors that they in-
duce in the human, which would lie on our vertical axis
in between the ones studied in this paper. Examples of
influencing methods relevant for our study can be propa-
ganda (i.e., misinformation Mintz et al. (2012); Kumar
& Geethakumari (2014) and disinformation Graham &
Metaxas (2003)), which may be done on limited but con-
siderable stretches of time; or working cultures which can
influence a programmer in different ways when changing
jobs.
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